Dialogue  July - September, 2003 , Volume 5  No. 1

South East Asia and Major Powers
S. Gopal

Introduction

South East Asia, a geographical bridge between Indian and Pacific ocean lies astride the vital sea lanes on which China, Japan and the US depend for their trade and commercial links with West Asia and the east coast of Africa. About 50000 vessels use the 500 nautical mile Malacca straits every year. Considered a repository of large quantities of raw materials including oil and natural gas, its strategic potential is obvious. It is therefore not surprising that every major power tries to garner as much influence as possible over the region. The region, with its complexity in ethnicity, languages, religion and different levels of economic development presents a complex mosaic of security problems.

A study of the region’s relations with the major powers could be divided into three periods,(1) Post colonial and Cold war (2) Post cold war (3) Post Sep 11, 2001.

During the colonial period, independence and student movements as well as other groups, like the communist movements had some convergence of interests despite the ethnic or national divides in the region. The convergence did not however translate into much during the colonial period, leaving the countries of the region governed on different principles of the concerned colonizers.

The failure of the attempted coup in Indonesia, and establishment of Suharto’s New Order government in 1965 helped in removing the sub-regional strains produced by his predecessor’s policies including efforts to crush the newly formed Malaysia. ASEAN, established in this climate in 1967 helped in gradually building a sense of common interest and regional association among its members. AFTA, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement created in 1992 by the parent body has become a key institution in Southeast Asia succeeding in developing a sense of community among its very disparate members, and paving the way for closer economic cooperation. The annual post-Ministerial consultations held after ASEAN’s meetings provided a venue for the ASEAN member governments, to meet, at foreign Minister level, with their counterparts and discuss matters of mutual and regional interests. These counterparts, termed “dialogue partners”, include USA, Russia, Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, China, Japan and New Zealand. Discussions on regional security were further developed leading to the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which includes ASEAN and its dialogue partners. A significant aspect of the economic policies of the region since the ending of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union, has been the total change over to market economics, albeit with more governmental political control than in the West. There is virtual unanimity among these countries about the commitment to economic development based on relatively open markets, private ownership and competition.

Simultaneously there has been unprecedented economic growth stymied to some extent by the economic meltdown in 1997. Many believe that Southeast Asia will develop in this century as a major centre of economic power and influence.

The region became a battle ground of the cold war with many a proxy battle. The 30 year Vietnam War was one of those tragic battles based on Eisenhower’s so called “domino” theory. Again the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia brought back the cold war to the region.

Historically the region’s security problems were communist insurgencies, ethnic separatist movements, religious and racial issues. Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore have neutralized communist insurgencies by the mid 80s.The Thai Muslim groups have also petered out. In Philippines communist and Muslim insurgencies (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) in the south continue to pose significant problems. In Burma the key issue of autonomy for different ethnic groups like Kachin and Karens remains unresolved. In Indonesia Independence of East Timor has been resolved though the problem of Aceh is still festering.

After World War II most of these countries followed international policies which were in greater accord with those of the west, more particularly the U.S. Most of them developed an intense anti communist attitude and relied on US military presence in the region for security against onslaught of communism. With the end of World War II and subsequent beginning of cold war, the western countries brought the countries of this region into various defence and security arrangements like the five power defence arrangements which included Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei UK, Australia and New Zealand. Bilateral security pacts between the U.S and Philippines and U.S. and Thailand, gave the U.S., bases in these countries. ANZUS signed in 1951 between Australia, New Zealand and the US was another piece of alliance system augmenting the US presence in the region and was the direct result of the assessment by Australia and NZ that it is the US and not UK which can guarantee their security. Vietnam had signed a treaty of friendship with the USSR, apprehending security threats from China. After the Vietnam War a kind of regional balance existed between Soviet supported communist Indo China and anti communist ASEAN whose security was underwritten by the U.S. Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea however created consternation among the ASEAN countries and brought these, China and the U.S. together in a common cause.

After the cold war the interests of the major powers in the region have been much less conflicting and have contributed to regional stability. Economic issues took the forefront in developments in this region which saw a remarkable forward movement. The US withdrawal from its bases in the Philippines and withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Camranh Bay in Vietnam brought the security issues again to the fore, particularly in view of the aggressive behaviour of China with regard to Paracels and Spratlys group of islands in South China Sea.

ASEAN tried to deal with the new security situation by forming ASEAN regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 at the multi lateral level and the council on security cooperation in the Asia pacific (CSCAP) at the unofficial level. China was included in the ARF as part of the new policy of “constructive engagement “instead of confrontation. Through the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, ASEAN members had already pledged among themselves to resolve intra-ASEAN disputes peacefully (or postpone their resolution). The idea behind the concept of a larger security order was that the commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes could be extended to other states. While ASEAN would not expect outsiders to come automatically to members’ aid in times of crisis, outside countries could be asked to renounce the use of force in settling any conflicts with the Association’s members. The unstated object of these concerns was evidently China—the only non regional state with territorial claims in Southeast Asia. The The U.S., Japan and China had to be persuaded to see that such security multilateralism was in their interests. ` The first Bush administration opposed the idea, fearing that a multilateral security body would somehow weaken traditional bilateral U.S. ties in the region.The Clinton administration saw multilateral diplomacy as a useful tool to make the allies share the security costs. Clinton did not think that a Pacific security forum would harm the traditional U.S. alliances. Japan viewed ARF as giving it a role in regional security affairs independent of the United States. China was however suspicious of any institutionalized multilateral security arrangements and preferred bilateral dealings. Although the 1995 ARF meeting discussed the Spratlys issue with the Chinese making some vague promises about future ministerial discussions, China continued to insist on bilateral discussions with other claimants on the issue of Spratlys and refused to accept third-party mediation. It made acknowledgement of its sovereignty a precondition for considering joint development activities. The continued hard line coupled with Beijing’s growing naval activities in South China Sea forms the basis of the perceived “China Threat” in the region.

The council for security cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) had been established in June 1993 as a track II or non governmental forum to deal with security issues. Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. in addition to ASEAN countries became founding members. India is also a member. It is a process parallel to the ARF and deals with security issues.

With the growing economic foundations of these countries security has become an important agenda point in ASEAN foreign ministers meetings. Main hurdles in a smooth security environment include the bilateral disputes between the countries in the region like the unresolved territorial disputes and spill over of internal conflicts of one country into the neighbour.

Politico security issues like US military presence in the region, perceived potential threats from China, larger role for Japanese in regional security, security of maritime routes, etc. exist. Chinese awarding of a contract to a U.S firm for drilling rights in disputed area, its occupation of Mischief reef claimed by Philippines, building of a runway on one of the Paracel islands which can accommodate both fighter and transport aircraft are all disturbing developments for the countries of the region. Notwithstanding China’s bellicose attitude, the South East Asian states prefer to deal with China as an important power with whom they should have constructive engagement. They have been careful to avoid provocative rhetoric against China. The strains between the U.S. and China, over Taiwan and the U.S. attitude of domination have led to apprehension among these countries that the region may witness heightened tension and instability.

ASEAN states however have also successfully used the fears and ambitions of the major external powers to counter-balance each of them, without greatly sacrificing their independence.

The relations between South East Asia and the individual big powers could now be discussed in some detail.

China

From early on China realized the need for improving relations with these states and as a preliminary step, offered in the Afro Asian conference Bandung(1955), to sign the dual nationality treaty with those states with Chinese minorities, provided they recognized Taiwan as inalienable part of mainland China. With the exception of Indonesia, which has a sizeable Chinese minority, other states which followed pro western and anti communist policies did not respond favourably to this offer? China itself had not been recognised at that time by most of these states. Indonesia and the former Burma recognised China and the former signed the dual nationality treaty. The communist inspired coup in 1965,thought to have been orchestrated by China led to Indonesia breaking off diplomatic relations with China in 1967 and repudiating the treaty in 1969. ASEAN itself was not initially recognized by China. Among others, the reasons were the Vietnam War in which these nations sided with the U.S. and their continued recognition of Taiwan.

The Sino Soviet split in 1966 and the armed clashes between the two at Ussuri river in 1960, saw the start of realignments in the triangular relationship between the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China. With the U.S. ending the Vietnam war, recognizing PRC and accepting that “there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China “South East Asian Countries had now to rethink their strategy towards China with the clear message that there could be no more containment of China but only accommodation. Normalisation of ASEAN China relations naturally followed. Malaysia was the first to establish diplomatic relations (May 1974), Thailand (July 1975), Philippines (June 1975),Indonesia (August 1990), Singapore (October 1990). The delay by the Indonesians is due to the painful memories of the1965 coup. With the majority of population (75%) being Chinese, Singapore decided to wait for all others to establish diplomatic relations first. The greatest success for China in these developments was acceptance by all these countries that Taiwan is part of the PRC.

Deng Xiao Peng’s rise to power towards the end of the 70s and his emphasis on economic development and modernization saw some fundamental changes in the foreign policy of PRC. China needed help of the ASEAN countries in its modernization, particularly the Chinese community which controlled the economy in many of these countries. Sino ASEAN relations therefore saw an upswing. The Third Indo China war from December 1978, following Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea further strengthened the growing relations between China and the ASEAN states as the stand of both coincided. China aided the Khmer Rouge through Thailand as it has no direct border with Kampuchea.

Collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s normalisation of relations with the successor state Russia, U.S. withdrawal of its military from the region with the dismantling of Clark and Subic Bay bases in Philippines, withdrawal of Soviet forces from Camranh Bay in Vietnam and establishment of diplomatic relations with Indonesia were developments which gave greater opportunities to China for increased interactions with South east Asia.

Simultaneously the new security situation also led to assertive policies by China. It carried out a show of force in Taiwan straits by holding military exercises involving medium range M9 missiles in July 1995 followed by another round in March 1996.These tests
evoked serious concern among the ASEAN countries. Indonesia promptly entered into military cooperation agreement with Australia in Dec 1995.

Another area of assertiveness by China was the South China Sea. It involves conflicting claims by at least six countries. Chinese internal documents gave the raison d’etre for China’s stand on the South China sea. They said that the regions holds reserves of resources worth US $ 1 trillion which includes oil, natural gas, fish and modules of minerals like Manganese phosphorous etc. A Chinese survey in the region in 1989 announced that the south china sea floor contained 25 billion cm of natural gas, 370000 tons of phosphorous, 105 billion barrels of oil etc. They saw these as the main fall back position for “lebensraum” for the Chinese people in the coming century. China sees the geographical location of the south china sea between Indian and Pacific ocean as strategically vital.

The importance of South China sea has been admirably expounded by Li Hua Qing,a PLA Navy commander and the most articulate proponent of China’s push into the south china sea and securing it for economic exploitation. In an interview in 1984 Li said that one of the PLA-N ‘s main goals was to assert China’s sovereignty over its rich maritime resources including its off shore petroleum deposits, its manganese modules and its fish. Liu noted that China had a large and increasing population whose diet would require the protein supplied by fish. He also called for modernizing the navy. Since the late 1980s Chinese naval planners had called for changing from a coastal defence strategy to an offshore defence strategy extending the defence perimeter to between 200 nms and 400 nms from the coast, and even more in the case of the south china sea islands.

China’s actions in South China Sea had caused considerable disquiet among the nations of the region. It used force in 1974 to recapture some of the islands in the Paracel group till then occupied by the former South Vietnam. In a major naval encounter with unified Vietnam in March 1988, it destroyed several Vietnamese ships and occupied six islands of Spratly group. It decided to give legitimacy to its action by passing a law in National People’s Congress (NPC) in Feb 1992 declaring the entire archipelago of Paracel and Spratly group of islands as Chinese territory. It is interesting to note here that China, in a strict legal sense, is not eligible to be considered as an archipelagic state under the 1982 Law of the Sea convention with respect to Paracel islands though in May 1996 China laid claim under archipelagic principles.<†Ù¥…æ�¶+e{�7ŠÛ‰×^Ÿûb¶W¿…æ�n‡rn(–Šð†+^qéíz¸uãMÅ¢¶âuקþqéíz¸kqéíz¹àŠ|Ó�výǧµêÿn‡rþf•8^¥§]Šx-¡Ø¬i¹^1"±úâzweÉê뢺Z�äáz–�v)ඇb±¦åxĈÇë‰éÝ—'«®Šéj“…êZuا‚ÚŠÆ›•ã K®'§v\ž®º+¥¨N©i×bžhv+nWŒH�,~¸ž�Ùrzºè®– y8^¥§]Šx-¡Ø¬i¹^1"±úâzweÉê뢺Z�äáz–�v)ඇb±¦åxĈÇë‰éÝ—'«®Šéj