Dialogue July-September 2009, Volume 11 No.1
AfPak Strategy: Hobson’s choice
Indranil Banerjie
Introduction
US President Barack Obama is well on his way into
implementing his AfPak strategy, which was unveiled shortly after he took
office. The idea is to look at the war in Afghanistan in a composite manner,
taking into account, among other things, Pakistan’s intimate involvement. The
problem is that Taliban fighters find safe haven in Pakistan and can operate
with impunity against US and NATO forces across the border. The AfPak strategy
seeks to smash the Taliban by constricting them from two sides. US forces
operating on the Afghanistan side are expected to constitute the anvil while the
Pakistani Army on the other side of the border is to be the hammer. Between the
two, the hope is to pound and obliterate the Taliban.
Whether this will happen or not is the million dollar question. Either
way, the continued war in Afghanistan, the latest AfPak initiative included, is
destined to have a profound impact on the region. For, regardless of whether the
AfPak strategy succeeds or not, the United States really has only one long term
choice – that is to leave Afghanistan. The only uncertainty is the timing,
whether four years or fourteen.
This paper looks at the impact the war in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is having on Afghanistan, Pakistan, the region and the world as a whole.
I
Understanding the AfPak Strategy
Political
aspects of President Obama’s AfPak strategy and its implications for the war in
Afghanistan. What we should know about current US thinking.
Obama’s political compulsions
Barack Obama was not elected by the American people to solve the
Afghanistan problem. He was elected with a specific agenda of building a new
America, where market fundamentalism is to be replaced by welfare and social
concerns. Obama promised to fix the economy, provide more job security, health
care and welfare measures for the underprivileged. This is his priority. As he
looks to the end of his current 4-year term and possibly, another term, his aim
would be to deliver on those promises and keep the Democrats in
power.
The Democrats’, and Obama’s, biggest nightmare is Afghanistan turning into a quagmire sucking in
more and more resources and critical Presidential attention. Many of Obama’s key
advisor’s have warned him about repeating the mistakes of Lyndon B. Johnson, who
was voted to address domestic issues but who got inextricably entangled in the
Vietnam War, which eventually took all his attention and time. President Obama
will not let this happen to him. President Obama’s AfPak policy was articulated
in a speech he delivered on 27 March 2009 as well as in a White Paper issued on
the same day. In his Afghanistan speech, Obama clearly states that he would not
“blindly stay the course” and that he would evaluate his progress. Obama in
subsequent interviews has repeated that the US commitment to the Afghan war
would not be open
ended.
The next two years in Afghanistan will be crucial. If the increase in troop
levels and the AfPak strategy does not bear fruit, a wholly different set of
policies would be set into motion, which would include some sort of deal with
the Pakistanis, the Taliban and the Afghans. Towards the end of his term, Obama
would start downsizing in Afghanistan with a promise to pull out as from Iraq.
He would not like to be seen persisting in a rut from which there is no
escape.
Should his AfPak
strategy produce results in the next couple of years, then there would be less
motivation to start a phased withdrawal, although there would certainly be a
reduction in US forces. Long term commitment would be in the form of a core US
force providing the Afghan government and armed forces advisors, trainers and
technical support, perhaps even a limited degree of air power. At any rate, the
eventual aim is to wind down the US military presence, one way or the
other.
The
US and its allies in Afghanistan thus have only one long term choice: win or
lose, they have to eventually leave the country. Before leaving they have to
show some sort of progress and make an exit deal. That is the importance of
special envoy Richard Holbrooke, who achieved both fame and notoriety by ramming
down a deal in the Balkans.
This is the big picture.
Lessons learnt
President Obama ordered a review of the Afghan war with very good reason.
NATO was not winning the war and by end 2008 more American soldiers were dying
in Afghanistan than in Iraq. A review was imperative. Obama got together some of
the best experts on the region, including former CIA operative and old Pakistan
hand, Bruce Reidel, and the veteran diplomat, Richard Holbrooke, among others.
There is reason to assume that Obama realised that war winning should be the
core of the new strategy.
He was right if he thought
so. Because political dialogue follows and does not precede success in
anti-insurgency operations. This is a simple truth Indian politicians have
learnt over the decades. An enemy which thinks it is winning will not
negotiate.
At the same time, it was becoming increasingly obvious that
simply defeating the Taliban or ousting them from a particular area would not
help. This is what the US military had been doing in the past. Operating out of
fortified camps and forward operating bases, US forces would attack Taliban
concentrations as and when reported, inflict casualties, disperse the Taliban
and then return. Over the next few days the Taliban would creep back.
By
late 2006, it was clear that Taliban concentrations in southern and Eastern
Afghanistan had risen to very high levels. To counter this, the profile of the ISAF mission was raised. Five operational command areas were designated and
non-US officers took command of parts of the country for the first time in 2007.
The British, Canadians and the Dutch were given overall responsibility for
operations in the Southern Regional Command (Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol,
Uruzgan and Daikundi). The Germans were given the north because there was hardly
any activity there; the Italians were given the West; French Kabul; and the
Americans keep the turbulent east to themselves. Despite this overhaul, the
ground situation changed little and by end 2008, ISAF and US commanders had to
admit that the war was at a stalemate.
One of the first realisations by the Obama team
was that more troops were required to hold ground and give fight to the Taliban.
His envoys repeatedly requested the Europeans for more troops but they were
rebuffed. Obama initially talked about increasing US troop levels by 40,000 men.
In the end, he signed for only 21,000 more. The new contingents have been given
four tasks and four deployments. One group (estimated at 4,000) is merely for
training; about 11,000 for Helmand (Camp Leatherneck) and an equal number to
secure the areas around Kabul and the East.
The idea today is to hold ground, resurrect the long
gone civil administration, train and upgrade local police force, and prove to
the Afghan people that they can provide a viable and better administration than
the Taliban. Another critical objective is to raise the Afghan National Army
into a force capable of taking on the Taliban and defending the country’s
borders.
To be fair, the US military and leadership have been learning on the job. On 2
July 2009, the new US brigade in Helmand launched its first operation codenamed
Kanjar, which involved 4,000 Marines and additional Afghan National Army troops.
Brig. Gen. Larry D. Nicholson, the commander of Task Force Leatherneck, said:
“What makes Operation Kanjar different from those that have occurred before is
the massive size of the force introduced, the speed at which it will insert, and
the fact that where we go, we will stay, and where we stay, we will hold, build,
and work toward transition of all security responsibilities to Afghan forces.”
The new US commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has requested his
troops not to call in for air or long range artillery support except in the most
exceptional of circumstances. He has also briefed his officers on the importance
of avoiding civilian casualties.
The new emphasis is on holding ground and building local institutions. This is a
major departure in tactics. There are, however, doubts whether it will succeed
so late in the day. A news report in The New York Times (3 July 2009) remarked:
“Yet Taliban control of the countryside is so extensive in provinces like Kandahar and Helmand that winning districts back will involve tough fighting and
may ignite further tensions, residents and local officials warn. The government
has no presence in 5 of Helmand’s 13 districts, and in several others, like Nawa,
it holds only the district town, where troops and officials live virtually under
siege.”
Already the deficiencies are showing. In
operation Kanjar, only 650 ANA soldiers participated, pointing to a failure in
raising an effective Afghan army. The other glaring failure was that of the US
civilian component of Kanjar. None of the hundreds of civilians promised showed
up. Thus for the first time, the US war effort is witnessing a huge gap between
expectations and achievements.
Clearly, the war
has entered a new stage and there is no telling which way it will ultimately
swing.
Debate
Washington continues to be deeply divided in its views on the best means
to win the war in Afghanistan. One section favours total war with the single
minded pursuit of the total destruction of the Taliban and its allies in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. They argue that the war has not succeeded so far
precisely because its aims have been so muddled. The ISAF is building schools
and hospitals, doing guard duty as well as fighting.
Others argue that the main task is to build
civilian institutions and bring development to Afghanistan. This, they argue,
will win the war and not the killing of Taliban and pilling up of civilian
casualties. One section of US strategists feel that sending more troops into
Afghanistan would be counterproductive as it would cause more civilian
casualties, alienate the local population and do nothing for the long term
stability of Afghan
institutions.
This is one reason perhaps why President Obama scaled down the number of
additional troops for Afghanistan and highlighted the need for simultaneous
developmental activity. “So to advance security, opportunity and justice, not
just in Kabul but from the bottom up, in the provinces, we need agricultural
specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers. That’s how we can help the
Afghan government serve its people and develop an economy that isn’t dominated
by illicit drugs. And that’s why I’m ordering a substantial increase in our
civilians on the ground. ..At a time of economic crisis, it’s tempting to
believe that we can short-change the civilian effort. But make no mistake: Our
efforts will fail in Afghanistan and Pakistan if we don’t invest in their
future.” Obama declared in his
speech.
Thus the
strategy in Afghanistan will be two pronged: War fighting as well as
development. The AfPak White paper stressed: “Our counter-insurgency strategy
must integrate population security with building effective local governance and
economic development”. The latest operation (Kanjar) suggests that this policy
is being implemented seriously.
Desired End State
Successful wars are those that have a clear end state or clear objective.
If strategic aims are muddled then no amount of combat success will bring about
a clear win. In Afghanistan, the desired aim of the war is to defeat the al Qaida and prevent its return.
President Obama’s core statement is unambiguous: “I want the American people to understand
that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al
Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country
in the future. That is the goal that must be achieved." [President Barack Obama,
27 March 2009].
By al Qaida, President Obama also means the Taliban.
For, later in his speech, he clarified: “There is an uncompromising core of the
Taliban. They must be met with force. And they must be defeated. But there are
also those who have taken up arms because of coercion or simply for a price.
These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course.” Thus while
also identifying the Taliban as the enemy; he left the door open for
negotiations.
While President Obama and his team know what they are up against, there is
an inherent problem in the objectives. Disrupting, dismantling and defeating the
al Qaida might be the easy part but to prevent their return in the future is a
hugely difficult, if not impossible task.
There are many who
believe that an end state acceptable to the West is unlikely. One of UK’s top
military commanders, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, bluntly and publicly
declared: “We’re not going to win this war.” He felt that negotiations with the
opposing Taliban were the only way out and that the world should not expect a
decisive victory in Afghanistan.
There are two parts to the problem. One is creating a stable, progressive government in Afghanistan that is capable of taking care of its own security. This is not going to happen soon. President Hamid Karzai remains dependent on Washington for his political and physical survival. Afghanistan is far from acquiring the status of a functioning democracy and an indigenous army capable of taking on the Taliban is many years away. The other part of the problem is Pakistan, which continues to view Afghanistan as part of its sphere of influence and is bound to interfere in one way or another once US forces leave.
II
Impact within Pakistan and likely scenario
Pakistan is the key to stability in Afghanistan. This much the AfPak policy
recognises clearly. As President Obama said in his AfPak policy speech, “we must
recognize the fundamental connection between the future of Afghanistan and
Pakistan; which is why I’ve appointed Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who is here,
to serve as special representative for both countries, and to work closely with
General Petraeus to integrate our civilian and military efforts.”
The aim of the AfPak strategy is to destroy the
al Qaida and its allies in Pakistan. President Obama argued that “al Qaeda and
its extremist allies are a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from within. It’s
important for the American people to understand that Pakistan needs our help in
going after al Qaeda. This is no simple task. The tribal regions are vast, they
are rugged and they are often ungoverned. And that’s why we must focus our
military assistance on the tools, training and support that Pakistan needs to
root out the terrorists.”
Apart from military
aid, the United States will provide the Pakistan government US $ 1.5 billion
dollars worth of economic assistance through the John Kerry and Richard Lugar
Bill. The aim is to build schools, hospitals and other welfare projects. This
time though, the money given to Pakistan will be very closely
monitored.
The big question is whether
Pakistan will or can deliver. The immediate task is to contain and destroy the
Taliban and its allies in Pakistan’s tribal and other areas. The civilian
leadership, judging from the recent statements by President Asif Zardari, seems
determined to rid the country of jihadis, if for no other reason, then because
the future of mainstream politics depends on
it.
The
attitude of the Pakistani Army remains somewhat ambivalent. While the Army seems
determined to smash the “rebel” outfits like that of Maulana Fazlullah, Maulana
Faqir Mohammad and Baitullah Mehsud, the original Taliban led by the one-eyed
mullah as well as pro-establishment jihadi outfits like the Jammat ud Dawa
remain protected.
Successful containment of Taliban insurgents in the
rugged FATA and NWFP districts require fairly large and sustained troop
deployments. Pak army is not entirely willing to do this, or else it is not
entirely capable. Although it does appear that the Pakistan Army has committed
fairly large numbers of troops. According to one estimate, the Pakistani Army
has deployed almost 80 battalions in NWFP and FATA to combat the extremists.
In most places, a combination of Frontier Corps
(FC) and Army units are involved in the fighting. FC(North), which is
responsible for the NWFP and FATA areas, is said to have 14 groups of three
battalions each. The Pakistani Army’s crack SSG units as well as the US trained
SOF (Special Operations Forces) are also involved in the fighting. Two squadrons
of helicopter gunships have also been deployed and close air support is being
provided from Peshawar and Sargodha.
The Pakistan Army
divisions involved are believed to be roughly as
follows:
Swat - 37 Div plus FC (ex Gujranwala)
Buner - 23 Div (ex
Jhelum)
North Waziristan - 7 Div (ex Peshawar)
South Waziristan - 9 Div 9 (ex Kohat)
Bannu,
Dera Ismail Khan & Mir Ali - 14 Div (ex Okara)
Dir & Bajaur - Ad Hoc FC(N) force headed by IG Maj. Gen. Tariq
Khan
Reserve - 17 Div (ex Kharian) plus additional units from LoC
The X Corps HQ has been moved from Rawalpindi to Swat.
Significantly, the Pakistani Army, contrary to expectations, has moved
substantial forces from the borders to NWFP & FATA.
Impact of Current Operations
Militants in Swat, Buner, Bajaur and parts of Waziristan have been severely
disrupted. However, there is serious dispute about the Pakistani Army’s claims
of thousands of militants killed. Some sources have been bandying the figure of
7000 militants killed by Pak army in recent times. It would be surprising if
they actually killed even half that number. For, a close scrutiny of media
reports emanating after the fighting will show the scepticism of most foreign
reporters’ to the Army claims. Most reports point to the astonishing fact that
they rarely found the presence of dead bodies in the areas bombed and cleared.
The jihadis in the FATA and NWFP have fought the Pakistani Army earlier and are
not idiots who would wage a conventional war against a superior force that will
not hesitate to call in air and artillery support. As in the past, this time too
the jihadis have taken to the mountains where they will continue to harass the
Army.
The
Pakistani Army has been using heavy artillery and air support to conduct these
operations. A record number of people have been displaced. Some estimates claim
more than 3 million people have been displaced in Swat and Buner alone. This is
an astounding way to fight an insurgency.
The Indian Army has
been fighting insurgencies in Kashmir and the North-East. Nowhere has it caused
such a catastrophic exodus. What could be the reason for this? Two
possibilities: One that the Pakistan Army has no idea how to conduct
anti-insurgency operations where the aim is to painfully but carefully separate
the chaff from the grain. The Pakistan Army appears to think that everything
needs to be ground to dust. This might be permissible in a conventional war
against an enemy country but is ridiculous in an in-country operation. The other
possibility is that the entire affair has been deliberately choreographed.
Perhaps it was no coincidence that the latest Pakistan Army operation in Swat
began the day President Zardari along with DG ISI and DGMO in tow arrived in
Washington D.C. President Obama had summoned the presidents of both Pakistan and
Afghanistan to demand cooperation, offer incentives and spell out some pretty
tough disincentives. Thus while the three presidents “discussed” the vexed
problem on the far reaches of the planet, the Pakistan Army once again began
occupying position in Swat, abandoned only in January of the previous year.
At the same time, there is also a realisation within the Pakistani
military high command that they must crush a section of jihadis that have turned
against the Pakistani state. General Musharraf’s actions in Lal Masjid were a
turning point. Jihadis once nurtured by Pak establishment turned rogue. Many
jihadis saw the Pakistani army as unreliable and mainstream politicians as
enemies. They felt that the United States was dictating terms and the Pakistani
establishment was following an anti-Muslim agenda.
This led to the beginning of
attacks on the establishment. Gen. Musharraf too had come under attack. This
trend is going to continue. Its intensity would depend on how much the Pakistani
Army can weaken the anti-state jihadis. But the schism that has been created
between Pak establishment and jihadis is not going to go away. Also, today Pak
army realises that the jihadis are now trying to fight for the same political
and ideological space.
This internal conflict will
intensify, especially after the US exits the region. Moreover, it is now clear
that the schism between the jihadis and mainstream forces is not restricted to
NWFP and the FATA. Punjab and Sindh too have been affected. There are
significant pockets of dormant jihadis in these two
provinces.
Moreover, this schism
finds reflection even within the armed forces. There have been reports of mutiny
in Parachinar, Kohat and Turbat (Balochistan). The Army leadership has been
forced to renew indoctrination and stress that their actions are correct and the
jihadis are wrong. But there is a problem. Well known analyst and author, Ahmed
Rashid, has pointed out that the Pakistani army chief is facing an ideological
dilemma: “He cannot tell his men that they are fighting for Islam, because that
is what the jihadis themselves are saying”.
Secondly, the wide
displacement of civilians due to the Swat, Buner and Waziristan offensives is
bound to have an extremely negative long term effect. Locals will view the
Pakistani army and establishment as hostile. Relief has been poor while states
such as Sindh and to a lesser extent Punjab have not welcomed the IDPs.
(Internally displaced
persons).
Recent reports suggest that ethnic sentiments, especially anti-Pashtun,
sentiments are growing. In Karachi there have been terrible clashes.
Basic problem in Pakistan is that the establishment cannot change its
politico-ideological orientation which is essentially anti-India. It requires an
Islamic identity to distinguish itself from the subcontinent’s overarching
culture and traditions. Today, it is clear that the Pakistani establishment’s
ideological choices have led to extremism within. Even Western analysts realise
that the Pakistani thinking is flawed and that it is itself responsible for
creating the Taliban threat.
A recent report[i]
by a US think tank pointed out: “The government of Pakistan played a pivotal
role in strengthening extremists among the Pashtuns by helping the Taliban take
over Afghanistan and supporting the regime throughout the 1990s. Indeed,
Pakistan was one of only three states (with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates) to recognize the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan.
This policy stemmed from a pre-occupation with India. A weak, but sympathetic,
regime in Afghanistan ‘so the thinking went’ would give Pakistan much sought
after “strategic depth,” allowing its military forces, in the event of an Indian
invasion, to retreat westward into the Afghan mountains, regroup, and then
counterattack across the Indus. An attempt to address one strategic threat thus
laid the foundation for another.”
Scenarios
Pak army decisively defeats Taliban in FATA & NWFP. Initiates moves to
“de-Islamise” the country’s identity. Highly unlikely
Pak
Army has partial victory and occupies permanent position in the towns. Continues
with anti-India, Islamic identity. Nurtures pro-establishment, anti-India jihadi
groups. Very likely.
Pak Army loses FATA
battle. Unlikely.
The second
scenario is the most likely. The problem is that this stance combined with
Pakistan’s increasing economic problem can only ultimately lead to a severe
internal crisis in Pakistan. Given regional instability and intensifying
sub-nationalistic demands, the state could even start showing signs of break up.
Question is how we would deal with an unstable and perhaps disintegrating
Pakistan in the long term?
III
Impact on India & Region
Stable
political institutions and a professional, subservient military force are
unlikely to emerge in Afghanistan in the short or medium terms. Regional forces,
as well as some global powers, will continue to play their games in Afghanistan
for a long time to come. What will India do?
As of now, the success of the US and its allies in containing the
conflict in Afghanistan has shielded most regional countries from the adverse
fall out of the war. Prior to the US intervention, all regional countries were
affected in varying degrees by the situation within Afghanistan and most of them
tried to influence events within that country. Most regional countries, with the
exception of Pakistan, were completely against the Taliban regime for various
reasons. Iran, India and Tajikistan actively aided the Northern Alliance against
the Taliban. Turkmenistan was the only regional country to remain successfully
neutral during the Taliban years.
Most regional countries,
India and Iran included, while wary of expanding NATO influence in the region,
broadly accept that US intervention has stabilised the situation. They also
realise that they would be adversely affected should the US leave Afghanistan
without defeating the Taliban and its allies. This is one reason why most
countries including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Iran are helping the
US war effort in one way or another.
The question is what will happen once the US and NATO forces exit the region?
Post-NATO Afghanistan
In the long run, US and NATO presence in Afghanistan will be minimal but not
non-existent. Left largely to itself, Afghanistan could probably take on the
Taliban and restore a semblance of stability. Even a Taliban government by
itself would not be a cause for concern. A weak Taliban contained by strong
neighbours would still be manageable.
Afghanistan is
not the problem. Instability in a weak, impoverished nation can be contained. It
can be argued that Iran as well as the weak Central Asian states neighbouring
Afghanistan can secure their borders and prevent Taliban infiltration. Countries
like Tajikistan and Turkmenistan might require a bit of help but not Uzbekistan.
But no regional country is likely to even contemplate actively intervening in
Afghanistan. Without US military presence no other country or coalition will get
militarily involved in Afghanistan. However, different countries are likely to
fund and support their favourites within that country.
Pakistan is
in a different league with its huge population, considerable resources,
ideologically motivated groups, powerful military and a history of using
extremists as foreign policy instruments. Consequently, it is the impact on the AfPak strategy on Pakistan that needs to be assessed as a
priority.
There is little chance of the Taliban keeping to themselves. The most
pro-active would be Pakistan that would seek to establish its hegemony over the
country through the Taliban or through another grouping with a very different
name. In short, Pakistan will get involved in Afghanistan militarily as well as
politically.
How
Pakistan’s active intervention will affect the politico-security environment in
the region is difficult to assess given that most countries in the region are
themselves in a state of flux. These countries include the economically and
politically weak Tajikistan, the economically beleaguered Karimov regime in
Uzbekistan, cash strapped Turkmenistan and dissension ridden Iran. The other
Central Asian and Caucasus states are equally unlikely to get involved in any
manner.
While there would be a trickle effect of jihadi
elements into regional countries, it is unlikely to be a deluge. These regional
countries would also be ruthless in eliminating jihadi elements within their
borders and funding anti-jihadi forces within
Afghanistan.
There is also a strong possibility
of the de facto partition of Afghanistan along Pashtun and non-Pashtun lines.
The Tajiks, the Uzbeks, Hazaras and some smaller non-Pashtun groups had been
severely mauled by the Pashtun Taliban in the past and they are not likely to
let history repeat itself. Despite attempts at de-weaponisation in Afghanistan,
ethnic minority as well as most Pashtun commanders have retained most of their
weaponry. Some groups, particularly the Tajiks, have also grown immensely rich
post-2001 and have purchased large tracts of land in and around Kabul. This time
they will not let Kabul go as easily as it went in the past. It is also
suspected that this time round the Americans are secretly helping the Tajiks.
For, it was the Tajiks mainly who helped US forces clear the country of the
Taliban in 2001 and 2002. The Americans must be aware that a civil war could
well break out along ethnic lines once they depart. The former Northern
Alliance, like the Kurds in Iraq, will not be entirely forgotten.
Whether or not this de facto partition will endure
depends largely on the vigour with which Pakistan thrusts into that country. My
readings suggest that this time, the Pakistani Army would not find it easy to
overrun Afghanistan for three reasons: first, the last time, the Pakistani
establishment had Washington’s nod to use the Taliban, this time they do not
have that; second, the Americans would continue to monitor the region and fund
both Pakistan and Afghanistan long after they exit the region militarily; and,
third, the regional countries would be more pro-active in supporting anti-jihadi
forces.
India and its
diplomatic operations in Afghanistan would be a major Pakistani and jihadi
target. The continuation of Indian missions and national presence in that
country in the form of large number of commercial entities and their employees
would be contingent, as of now, entirely on the goodwill of the former Northern
Alliance leadership and its Pashtun partners. This is not a happy scenario.
Ideally, Indian objectives and its missions in Afghanistan should be secure
irrespective of whichever political dispensation occupies power in Kabul. This
is the goal our Afghan policy should aspire to. Or else the US $ one billion
plus assistance to Afghanistan would have been in vain. Moreover, next time
round too we might have to beat a hasty retreat out of Afghanistan as in
1996.
It should
also be recognised that of all the regional countries, India is the least
shielded from the impact of the AfPak strategy because of its multifaceted
relationship and multiple impact points with Pakistan.
The first set of
problems arises from Washington’s belief that the only way to get the Pakistani
Army to “re-tool” for its western borders is to ease the “Indian threat” in the
east. In order for this to happen, the Americans feel that Kashmir, supposedly
the only major irritant in India-Pakistan relations, needs to be resolved.
Washington does not go along with the Indian view that Kashmir is kept on the
boil by the Pakistani Army in order to sustain its anti-Indian rhetoric within
Pakistan. By keeping Kashmir alive, the Pakistani Army, among other things,
ensures its own dominance and importance in the Pakistani polity. Whatever be
the reality, the fact is that the AfPak policy has put tremendous pressure on
New Delhi to first begin dialogue with Islamabad and then re-start negotiations
for a “final settlement” of Kashmir.
There are other points of
impact in the Pak-India relationship: political, military, trade and the jihadi
factor.
Militarily, there is unlikely to be any sea change on the ground, despite a
significant amount of thinning out of Pakistani Army assets from the borders for
the FATA operations. Political and trade relations should improve in the medium
term as US pressure on both countries would seek to achieve tangible results and CBMs. The jihadi factor would continue to be a major problem for India as the
Pakistan based jihadis would seek to hurt India, undermine its prestige and
regional role as well as exacerbate tensions between
New Delhi and
Islamabad.
Yet, on the whole, India is on a potentially good
wicket. But in the end, it will depend on how the country’s leadership takes on
American pace and Pakistani ‘doosra’ attacks. A last point to note is that
Washington has no reason to foist unpopular or damaging decisions on New Delhi.
This applies to a Kashmir “solution” as well. For, the US might need Pakistan in
the short and medium terms, but it needs India far more in the long term. India
needs to develop the stamina to pursue long term policy in a sustained and
unrelenting manner. It also needs institutions and mechanisms to sustain such an endeavour.
IV
Global Impact
Afghanistan is intimately linked with larger geopolitical issues involving
Asia. Europe is withdrawing, the US is growing weaker, and China is growing more
powerful while Russia is stagnating. Political Islam has emerged as a major
global force as Muslims seek greater voice and control of their destinies.
Afghanistan is a key battle in the larger geopolitical
war.
Some
strategic thinkers in the United States are beginning to believe that Iraq and
Afghanistan could be the precursors to endemic irregular warfare in different
parts of the world.
This is one reason why a host of former US
secretaries of state, including Henry Kissinger and Madeline Albright, are
arguing for more funding for the State Department. The idea is to use civilian
diplomacy and economic development to achieve US foreign policy goals. Writing
in Foreign Policy (2 July 2009), analyst Robert Haddick says: “The era of
“persistent irregular conflict,” if that is what we are in, will not occur in
European or Asian capitals, but at forward operating bases and combat outposts. In these cases, the interlocutors of U.S. diplomats and development specialists
will in many cases be tribal and non-state groups rather than government
officials.”
Afghanistan may well be the last European combat commitment
outside their continent. This signals the weakening of Europe as well as its
growing inwardness. Europe has become a high cost economy that is increasingly
unable to compete with many of the emerging economies of Asia and South America.
Within European society, religious and ethnic intolerance is growing as is
evident from recurring race riots and the rise of the right wing. French
President Sarkozy might have opened France’s first overseas military base in the
Gulf last month, but he is unable to get his soldiers to fight in Afghanistan
or increase their numbers in any significant manner. In all, Europe is battening
down.
China is keeping out of the turmoil in Afghanistan
and instead concentrating on other countries in the region. It views Pakistan as
a close ally and feels it will stand to gain in whatever dispensation that would
follow post-NATO in Afghanistan.
Russia too accepts that the US is as of today securing its southern belly.
This is why Moscow has allowed the passage of weaponry, troops, and supplies to
traverse its territory on way to Afghanistan. This is a significant concession
coming as it does during a period of continuing crisis in US-Russia relations,
which are dominated by larger security and disarmament
concerns.
The rest
of the world too realises the importance of the Afghan war but in different
ways. The supporters of political Islam all over the world are counting on the
Taliban and the al Qaida to humble yet another super power. Such a defeat would
add hope to their cause and swell their ranks with fresh volunteers. These
forces are ranged against the status quo in the Muslim world and various
democratic regimes under fire from jihadi terrorists.
The War in
Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the Palestinian question continues to exercise
the Muslim world, as does the continued existence of authoritarian regimes. The
United States and several European states continued to be viewed as supporters
of authoritarian regimes and an unrelenting anti-Muslim agenda. This was the
real cause for the War in Afghanistan. That factor remains despite President Obama’s best intentions. It would therefore be naive to assume that Afghanistan
would cease to become a conflict zone following the weakening or even defeat of
the Taliban. The world is in for a long period of global sporadic conflict.
Sadly, Afghanistan will remain in the vortex of conflict for many years to
come.
There
can be only one logical conclusion to any strategy devised in
Washington:
Ultimately, Afghanistan will have to be left to itself and to the mercy of
Pakistan. The future of Afghanistan depends on what kind of Pakistan will emerge
once the AfPak strategy has run its course.
Notes [i] Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan By Andrew M. Exum, Nathaniel C. Fick, Ahmed A. Humayun, David J. Kilcullen June 2009. Center for a New American Security.
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