Dialogue January-March, 2010, Volume 11 No. 3
India’s Energy^ Security and the Asian Oil Resources: Prospects and Challenges
The Gulf contributing around 42 per cent of the world’s oil reserves has been the key supplier of the global hydrocarbons ever since the discovery of oil. However, the recent years have also seen the evolution of other regions, rich in hydrocarbon reserves. Some of the Asian countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar, sharing borders with India do have high prospects and are therefore essential sources for the external stakeholders. This has also increased the competition between the external players. An important point to note is that the new demand is coming from rising Asia. The booming economies of these countries have compelled the external players to find its share in this scramble for oil. The present chapter shall try to investigate the entry of external stakeholders in the energy rich regions, especially Asia.
Oil accounts for a larger share in the global energy mix, especially in the developing world. Hence, in a context, where changes in the global energy demand are bringing pressure to increase production and revenue. It would be topical to probe, how the Asian energy consumers can cooperate or compete to gain these energy resources. A primary focus of this chapter would be to analyze the prospects for the Asian stakeholders to have an intra - regional energy trade, with special reference to India’s extended neighbours.
India’s dependence on imported oil to meet its requirements has exceeded 75 per cent and the given chaos in the middle east, India will have to find alternative energy supplies to ensure its energy security. However, India will not be the only consumer country striving for these resources, thus increasing the stakes. The chapter will focus specifically in the Indian context.
Access to cheap and reliable energy supplies, as is the simplest definition of ‘Energy Security’ has become essential for the functioning of today’s booming economies. However, the demand overtaking the supply scenario has led to significant vulnerabilities for these economies. This has brought many states into conflicting situation for energy. The fourteen member cartel – OPEC controls majority of these reserves. The US based Energy Information Administration (EIA) states that, ‘because non - OPEC countries’ smaller reserves are being depleted more rapidly than OPEC reserves, their overall reserves – to - production ratio - an indicator of how long proven reserves would last at current production rates – is much lower standing at about 15 years for non - OPEC states and 80 years for OPEC members. This implies that OPEC countries are expected to take up a higher proportion of world petroleum production over the long term’1. World’s proven oil reserves by region in 2007 are, North America - 25,914 (mb), Latin America - 134,691 (mb), Eastern Europe - 129,049 (mb), Western Europe - 15,110 (mb), Middle East - 741,566 (mb), Africa - 119,572 (mb) and Asia and Pacific - 38,282 (mb)2. While, the natural gas reserves by region in 2007 are, North America - 7,626 (bcm), Latin America - 7,890 (bcm), Eastern Europe - 58,886 (bcm), Western Europe - 5,458 (bcm), Middle East - 73,559 (bcm), Africa - 14,541 (bcm) and Asia and Pacific - 15,166 (bcm)3.
The developing Asia is going to play an important role in the international oil market in the years to come. By 2010, Asia will be the world’s largest consumer of energy. Many of the Asian countries, namely China, India, Japan, etc. are heavily dependent on the Gulf supplies. According to International Energy Agency (IEA), China will import 5.9 to 6.9 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2020, constituting 63 to 70 per cent of total oil consumption4. Implications of the external stakeholders growing interest in these energy rich regions, could be both detrimental and favorable to the Asian interest in general and India’s in specific. This will depend upon, how the growing Asia makes best possible use of its technological expertise and cooperate to reap the benefits. It can be argued that a positive sum - sum or a win – win situation could be derived, serving the interests of all the stakeholders.
The increasing presence of the countries in the Gulf5 energy market and the run for scramble for energy, articulated by the stake holders have enhanced the Gulf region’s strategic importance. It can be argued that the presence of external players in the Gulf energy market will build a new level of intensity of competition. This competition might lead to cooperation or conflict (the latter most of the times). The alternative scene could be that the presence of external players (e.g., US, EU, Asia at large, etc.) would help the Gulf states to ensure security of their energy infrastructure. Clearly, the external player’s energy interest in the region is well served by the Gulf states making it more secure and stabilized. With this, the Gulf also provides a unique opportunity for the various stakeholders including India to contribute collectively in the regional security arrangement and utilizing the energy resources in the best possible manner. According to OPEC statistical bulletin (2007), “Saudi Arabia has the leading oil reserves with 264.209 mb in 2007, while Kuwait and UAE stands second and third respectively. In case of natural gas reserves, Qatar stands first within the GCC with total reserves of 25.257 bcm in 2007”6. Qatar is the only GCC state having considerable amount of gas reserves followed by Saudi Arabia and UAE.
The recent years have seen an upward movement in the demand that is coming from rising Asia. Therefore, the Gulf energy market is also witnessing a paradigm shift in its direction of energy trade, from the West to the East. Apart from the rising Asia, India is an emerging player in the Gulf energy market. The coming energy demand is projected to be so huge, that it has to be met by internal as well as external sources. Today, India is engaged in as many as 47 countries in the energy segment7. India’s growing dependence on imported oil supplies has caused it to have an aggressive strategy to secure supplies overseas. India is one country, which is on equal par with China in its overseas energy security strategy. Rapidly growing urbanization, industrialization and better living standards has therefore led to growing use of energy. A few sets of figures provide a picture of how the landscape is changing - In 2005, 27.2 percent of India’s population lived in urban areas. By 2030, this figure is estimated to grow to 45.8 percent; the country’s per capita annual income is set to increase from $ 728 today to $ 5,930 by 20308.
For India, ‘energy security’ means ensuring uninterrupted supplies of energy to raise economic activities for sustained economic growth and development. India is the sixth largest oil consumer in the world and third largest in Asia9. It is already heavily dependent on imports to meet its oil demand and since the domestic oil production is forecast to fall from 0.9 mb/d in 2010 to 0.6 mb/d by 2030, the dependence on foreign imports is set to grow10. In 2005, India’s net imports of oil was 69 per cent while for gas, the net imports were 17 per cent11. India’s domestic supplies accounting for 30 per cent of the country’s demand, making it a net importer of oil12. India’s oil imports for 2005 and 2006 are US $ 27,754 billion and US $ 38,999 billion respectively, which is a 40.5 per cent change13. Saudi Arabia alone is estimated to supply about one – quarter of India’s import demand for oil, while Gulf countries’ overall account for 60 to 70 per cent of Indian oil imports14.
International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that, India’s oil imports will exceed 90 per cent by 202015. In addition to oil, the natural gas consumption has risen more rapidly, from 600 m cu ft/yr in 1995 to 960 m cu ft in 200316. The US based Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that the consumption will reach to 1.4 trn cu ft by 2010 and 1.8 trn cu ft by 201517. Most of the production originates from government refineries, their prices are controlled by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. India’s proven oil and gas reserves are 732 million metric tones and 763 billion cubic meters respectively18. The production of oil is 33 million tones while the demand stays much higher i.e. around 107 million tones and will rise to 190 million tones by 2011 – 201219. With regards to natural gas, the demand will also rise to 313 million metric standard cubic meters per day by 2010 – 201220. Overall, the scene of the future energy demand and the indigenous supplies are very bleak. According to the Commission’s report, oil dependence could go up to 90 – 93 per cent in 2031 – 32 from the current level of 72 per cent21. While the prospects are extremely poor for large and new energy supplies within Asia. In such a scenario, India’s energy requirements have compelled it to go global. On the other side, in order to build the indigenous production capacity, Indian energy sector will need a capital investment of $ 500 billion over the next 10 to 15 years22.
The Caspian region has emerged as a contender to the Gulf in terms of energy reserves. Five states that surround the Caspian Sea are Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. These littoral states are commonly known as the Caspian Basin countries. Over the coming years, as world oil demand continues to grow, the region will gain its importance by helping to diversify the sources of oil and gas for the consumer states beyond the traditional supply sources, i.e. the Gulf. Four of these countries have tremendous hydrocarbon potential. They are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. According to the BP statistical review at the end of 2007, Azerbaijan has 7.000 billion barrels (bb), Kazakhstan – 39.828 bb, Turkmenistan – 0.600 bb and Uzbekistan – 0.594 bb23. Since the fall of the Soviet Union (Russia) in 1991, the central Asian states have continued to be dependent on Russia for exporting their oil and gas. Oil production in the region has risen by approximately 70 per cent since many of the former Soviet states gained independence in the early 1990s24. Much of this is attributable to increased production in the Caspian states of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Caspian Sea oil and gas has a variety of potential markets. The Asian countries have also become attractive markets. Japan already imports a significant quantity of natural gas, while other economies like India and Chine growing rapidly. China’s oil and gas reserves are small which cannot bear the burden of its growing needs. This in turn has led to the building of an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China, which began running in November 2005.
Azerbaijan has one of the world’s largest oil deposits and despite its age – old production history, it still possesses huge amount of oil and gas reserves. The three biggest Azeri oilfields are being developed by the Azerbaijan International Operating Company, a twelve - company consortium which includes BP and Amoco (10)25. Kazakhstan, the largest country in central Asia, has three of the world’s richest hydrocarbon fields. One of them, Kashagan, was discovered in the Caspian and ‘is believed to rank among the five largest fields on Earth… Kazakhstan produced 1.2 million barrels a day last year (2005), but it is expected to pump 3 million barrels a day by 2015 - almost as much as Iran. Chevron is spending over $ 5 billion to expand production there, its largest project anywhere’26. Turkmenistan’s crude reserves and production are not so impressive but its gas reserves are considerable, the fifth largest known reserves. The country, a republic of the Soviet Union from 1924, had been under the control of Russia since the late 19th century. Thus, Former Soviet Union (FSU) exploited its natural resources i.e., hydrocarbons for many years. Iran, Russia and Ukraine are the main importers of Turkmenistan’s gas in 2005. Gas and oil together comprised over 80 per cent of exports in 2004 but Turkmenistan is heavily dependent on Russian pipelines to reach markets in Europe…27
Russia is the world’s second - largest producer and exporter of oil, after Saudi Arabia, and the largest producer of natural gas. Russia’s state - owned monopoly, Gazprom, dominated the Central Asian energy market. It could buy gas in central Asia for $ 65 per thousand cubic meters and sell it in Europe for four times as much28. Its strategy was to import increasing amounts of cheap gas from Central Asia and sell its own production to a more expensive European market. Asia’s growing economies has led them to search for overseas resources. Considering the fact that Central Asia enjoys prolific hydrocarbon resources, and Asia’s huge energy demands, there is no doubt about the significance of the Central Asian resources.
Europe’s energy dependency has been rising. It was 14.1 mbpd (approx.) in 2004 and is expected to grow to 15 mbpd (approx.) in 2010, 15.3 mbpd (approx.) in 2020 and 15.9 mbpd (approx.) in 203029. In terms of European demand for oil, the Caspian reserves, specifically Russia is crucial. Without them, ‘it is estimated that the oil exports from the Persian Gulf to Europe will increase by 0.5 MMbbl/d in 2010. However, if the Caspian Sea region fully participates in the export market, oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe will decreased to 1.5 MMbbl/d by 2010’30. Caspian countries vast oil and gas reserves are promising for the economic development of the developing countries and have managed to attract the attention of the global consumers interested in accessing these resources. Nonetheless, the available resources are still unrealized to the fullest and the Caspian countries remain inaccessible for the Asian countries like India. The Caspian states are a bowl of complex domestic political issues. Hence, the factors have contributed immensely in making the energy trade with the Caspian states a risky business. However, Russia has managed to exploit the resources in the region and reap heavy benefits by selling its double priced oil and gas in the European markets.
Bangladesh, our eastern neighbour’s oil and gas reserves were not so prominent, except in the beginning of 1990s, the prospects of gas finds in Bangladesh have put the gas rich country in the strategic sphere. The first oil and gas exploration took place in 1908, by the Indian Prospecting Company31. Since then, ‘…, between 1955 and 1971, 29 exploratory wells were dug and eight gasfields, with the ‘ultimately recoverable’ reserves of 9.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf) were discovered’32. Since then, more serious efforts were taken. ‘Bangladesh has 28 million barrels of proven oil reserves as of January 2006, down from 56 million barrels in 2005. The country produced an estimated 4,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil in 2005... Bangladesh had 5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves as of January 2006…’33. According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), Bangladesh has a potential new gas reserve of around 33.5 trillion cubic feet (TCF)34.
The oil exploration in Bangladesh has been rather unsuccessful, hence the oil companies choose to focus more on the gas reserves which are in abundance. Exploration and production (E & P) activities in the country is carried out by the Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration and Production Company (BAPEX), which is a subsidiary of the state - owned Bangladesh Oil, Gas & Mineral Corporation (Petrobangla). In 1993, after the formation of a new National Energy policy, the government of Bangladesh divided its offshore sites into 23 blocks and offered them to foreign oil companies through bidding. ‘The First Bidding Round took place in 1993 and eight blocks were awarded to four companies through PSCs. In 1997, during the Second Bidding Round, three PSCs were awarded covering four additional blocks’35. Natural gas exploration and production is dominated by three state - owned companies, all of which are subsidiaries of Petrobangla. ‘Bangladesh’s largest gas production company, Bangladesh Gas Fields Company Ltd. (BGFCL), operates the Sylhet, Kailashtila MSTE, Kailashtia, Rashidpur, and Beanibazar gas fields. From these five fields, BGFCL produces 810 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d), or roughly half of the country’s total natural gas production. The Sylhet Gas Field Company Ltd. (SGFCL) is Bangladesh’s second largest production company, producing 162 Mmcf/d of natural gas. SGFCL operates the Sylhet, Kailashtila MSTE, Kailashtia, Rashidpur, and Beanibazar gas fields. The third state - owned company involved in natural gas production and exploration is BAPEX, which produces about 58 Mmcf/d of natural gas from the Salda and Fenchuganj fields’36. Foreign companies today produce 501 Mmcf/d of natural gas from four gas fields. The leading foreign producer is Chevron, which produces 331 Mmcf/d from the Jalalabad and Moulavibazar fields, while UK’s Cairn Energy is the second largest foreign natural gas production company, producing 146 Mmcf/d of natural gas from Bangladesh’s lone offshore gas field at Sangu37.
In the recent years, the Asian oil corporations have been pressing the Bangladesh leadership to agree for gas exports to other countries via pipelines, but the government stands firm on the issue and insists that Bangladesh would consider the possibilities of exporting gas only after its sure that it has a reserve for its domestic consumption for 50 years. ‘Over a period of thirty years since 1972 the total government funding for Petrobangla (state - owned NOC) has been only US $ 300 million for exploration and field development purposes. Nevertheless, out of the twenty - two gas fields discovered in all, Petrobangla has discovered ten gas fields and one oil field’38. The prime question is that, who will benefit from Bangladesh’s gas? Bangladesh’s economy and infrastructure is in a terrible state and to explore Bangladesh’s gas, huge amount of investment and involvement of the International Oil Companies (IOCs) is required. ‘The Bangladeshi’s distrust these IOCs, particularly the American and the Western ones. In their view, the IOCs are only interested in making profits at the cost of Bangladesh’s precious resource. They are neither interested in helping Bangladesh develop faster and achieve high growth nor in the most beneficial utilization of the precious gas resource’39. The negative feeling for the IOCs is also added by the accidents it caused and that tainted the history of oil and gas operations in Bangladesh, e.g. the Magurchara gas blowout40. This has also made the issue of gas exports highly sensitive, which have also brought various humanitarian groups into picture and have politicized the matter. As a result, regular strikes and protest demonstrations were organized on the question of gas exports.
With this, the ‘Unocal Corporation (US based oil company) had submitted a gas pipeline proposal to the government of Bangladesh, which includes the construction of a thirty inch diameter, 847 mile (1,363 kilometer) long pipeline with an initial capacity of 500 Mmcfd (3.65 Tcf of natural gas in twenty years) of gas, from northeastern Bangladesh (from the Unocal - developed gas field Bibiyana (the field is expected to reach the maximum total production of 500 mmcfd by 2010. Once full production is realized, Bibiyana will be the largest producing gas field in the country) to New Delhi with an extension. According to Unocal projections, the government of Bangladesh is expected to receive an estimated US $ 3.7 billion (approximately 200 billion taka) in revenues and tax receipts’41. Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) was expected to participate in the Indo – Bangla gas project and the Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) was to act an overall leader.
The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) was also pressurized to allow the natural gas pipeline from Burma’s Shwe gas fields to be exported to India through Bangladesh. The pipeline could provide both economic and political benefits to the Government of Bangladesh. The pipeline could provide the government with access to additional gas supplies. Also, a pipeline through Bangladeshi territory could provide the country an upper hand in bargaining if any disputes with India arose in the future. However, the proposed pipeline is supposed to be a controversial issue. By allowing the pipeline through Bangladesh, the government would be engaging with a military junta, which would reap heavy profits from the deal.
However, the idea of exporting gas to India has come to a standstill, mainly because, ‘the country’s annual export income is over US $ 6 billion, annual income of US $ 160 - 185 million from gas will not be very impressive and the domestic use of natural gas is far more beneficial for the Bangladeshi people as consumers than exportation, because this is the cheapest source of energy for the country’42. Immediate forex, is what the government of Bangladesh needs, which can then be invested to further accelerate new exploration work to suffice to the domestic demand. According to the Tata Energy Resource Institute (TERI), India’s natural gas demand is expected to grow from 45 per cent in 2006 – 07 to 93 per cent in 2046 – 4743, hence, making it a viable and assured market for the Bangladeshi gas. While the Bangladeshi leadership has taken a U – turn from the deal, it feels that India has to look to other alternatives to ensure its energy security, while Bangladesh has lost a reliable market for its gas.
The strategic location of Myanmar cannot be overlooked. It shares common boundaries with countries like India, Bangladesh, China, etc. Over the past 10 to 15 years, the bulk of discoveries worldwide have come from deep water areas: Nigeria, Angola, Gulf of Mexico, Offshore Brazil and therefore the western coast of Myanmar is one of the last remaining deep water areas in the world which remains to be fully explored44. This makes it a significant energy player in Asia. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), Myanmar imported 13.50 and 12.73 thousand barrels of crude oil per day in 1999 and 2000 respectively, while Myanmar also exported 5,608.58 mcf of gas during 2001, earning US $ 523.13 million in foreign exchange45. Natural gas from these fields have been exported to Thailand since 1998, which have incurred Myanmar 300 mn dollars annually…46. Two International Oil Companies, Total of France and Unocal of US exploring gas in Myanmar, successfully connected the pipelines to connect the two fields, Yadana and Yetagun with Ratchburi on Thailand.
A Chinese oil major, Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was the first oil company to sign a production sharing contract (PSC) with the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) for M block in Rakhine – which is next to Daewoo’s A - 3 block in October 2004, at the same time that Daewoo found its commercial gas reserve. Daewoo (a major South Korean conglomerate), was allocated Block A – 1 in August 2000. Daewoo in turn sold 30 per cent of its interests of Block A – 1 to ONGC Videsh (20 per cent) and GAIL (10 per cent), thus providing India an opportunity to fulfill some of India’s requirements. This has further brought the possible routes for the Myanmar gas to India. ‘The first possible route could be to lay a pipeline connecting the Kaldan river in Myanmar, which has its tributaries in India’s Mizoram area in the north – east. This pipeline may then be linked up with India’s national oil and gas grid passing through Assam and Maghalaya. Secondly, an offshore connection between Sittwe port (few hundred kilometers from Kolkata) (Akayab) in Myanmar, near A – 1 Production Sharing Contract (PSC) exploration block, to some port in West Bengal state. From there it can be linked to the national network or the designated consumption points. And, thirdly, to link the gas field in Myanmar through a pipeline with the pipeline in Bangladesh, hopefully laid to carry gas from Bangladesh to India’47. The third option would be the most economically viable option, as it would suffice to India’s demands to an extent and give the two countries an assured market for their gas.
The global demand has been on a rise, especially for the rising Asia. Hence, the oil corporations wish to utilize every opportunity they see. Myanmar’s geographical location and shared borders is well exploited by the developing economies like India. This has also helped Myanmar in expanding its energy market. In case of Myanmar, India has lost the Myanmar – Bangladesh – India pipeline project after undergoing political irony and which led Myanmar to choose China (Myanmar Energy Ministry signed an MoU with PetroChina for sale of 6.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas from Block A - 1, Rakhine coastline reserve through an overland pipeline to Kunming (China) for 30 years)48. Myanmar took this decision, inspite of the fact that two national oil and gas companies from India held 30 per cent stakes in both these blocks. While, China had no equity stakes in these blocks. And, despite GAIL offering a price of $ 4.41 per million British Thermal Unit (mBTU), the Myanmar government decided to export the gas to China at $ 4.279 per mBTU49. It could be the reason for GAIL’s withdrawal from A – 7 Block.
Myanmar has been in Chinese energy radar for a long time not only for oil and natural gas reserves but also to build a pipeline connecting Sittwe port to Yunnan province…50. This pipeline would not just provide an alternative route for China’s oil imports from the Gulf and Africa, but also reduce its dependence on the traffic in the Malacca strait. In today’s world of uncertainty and scramble for resources, the decision taken by the Myanmar government of signing off the deal with the Chinese cannot be taken as ‘unexpected’. The pipeline project could have benefitted the tri – nations, bringing energy security and monetary assistance to the producing nations, specifically Bangladesh, as it could sell its surplus gas and have got the transit fees as well. However, any further delays may provoke Myanmar to sign off similar deals with other countries, leaving India to its state.
The Indian oil companies, specifically ONGC Videsh is having a stiff competition with the Chinese oil companies. However, energy co - operation between the two has been initiated but is yet to make a significant landmark. India needs to work towards not only addressing issues like the Bangladesh – India pipeline or the Myanmar – Bangladesh - India pipeline, but also to minimize the challenges it might face in its quest for energy security.
^ Energy = Hydrocarbons.
1. Phar Kim Beng and Vic Y.W. Li (November 2005), “China’s Energy Dependence on the Middle East: Boon or Bane for Asian Security?”, The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, p. 2 & 3, [Online: Web] Accessed 26th October 2008, URL: http://22.214.171.124/search?q=cache: Dje2fqjsDbkJ:www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/November_2005/Phar_Kim_Beng_and_Vic_Li.pdf+ Asian+energy+ dependency&hl= en&ct=clnk&cd=18&gl=in
2. “OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2007”, p. 22, Accessed 26th October 2008, URL: http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/pdf/ASB2007.pdf
3. Ibid, p. 22.
4. Phar Kim Beng and Vic Y.W. Li (November 2005), “China ’s Energy Dependence on the Middle East: Boon or Bane for Asian Security?”, The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, p. 1, [Online: Web] Accessed 26th October 2008, URL:http://126.96.36.199/search?q=cache:Dje2fqjsDbkJ: www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/November_2005/Phar_Kim_Beng_and_Vic_Li.pdf+Asian+energy+dependency&hl=en &ct=clnk&cd=18&gl=in
5. The Gulf refers to the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states.
6. Data is available with the OPEC Statistical Bulletin (2007), p. 47 & 49, See, http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/pdf/ASB2007.pdf
7. ONGC and the other National Oil Companies are already involved in 14 countries and are in process of getting established in 33 more countries.
8. Madan, Tanvi (November 2006), India, The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Energy Security Series, The Brookings Institution, p. 7, [Online: Web] Accessed 17 February 2007, URL: http://www.brookings.edu/fp/research/energy/2006india.pdf
9. Prabhakar, Akhilesh Chandra (April – June 2005), “Energy Security Cooperation and Geopolitics”, Dialogue, 6(4), p. 145.
10. Thirlwell, Mark and Anthony Bubalo (June 2006), “India looks West; the GCC looks East”, GCC – India Research Bulletin, Gulf Research Center (GRC), Issue – 2, p. 5.
11. Ishida, Hiroyuki (Wednesday, 12 July 2006), Energy Situation and Policy in India, Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, [Online: Web] Accessed 7 December 2006, URL: http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/data/pdf/357.pdf
12. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (2006), “Country Profile: India”, The Economist, p. 30.
13. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (2007), “Country Profile: India” The Economist, p. 31.
14. Ibid, no. x: 5.
15. Ibid, no. xii: 30.
16. Ibid: 30.
18. Ibid, no. ix: 146.
21. Pant, Girijesh (15th– 16th December 2006), Energy Security in Asia: An Indian Perspective, International Conference (The Geopolitics of Energy Security: The Rise of Asia), Organized by IDSA – IPRO, New Delhi, p. 2.
22. Manning, A. Robert (2000), The Asian Energy Factor: Myths and Dilemmas of Energy, Security and the Pacific future, New York: Palgrave Pubs., p. 120.
23. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (27th August 2008), World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, Most Recent Estimates, Accessed 27th October 2008, URL: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html
24. Winstone, Ruth & Ross Young (16th March 2005), “The Caspian Basin, energy reserves and potential conflicts”, p. 35, Accessed 31st October 2008, URL: http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2005/rp05-024.pdf
25. Arvanitopoulos, Constantine, “The Geopolitics of Oil in Central Asia”, Thesis, The Journal of Foreign Policy Issues, Accessed 27th October 2008, URL: http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/winter98/geopolitics.html
26. Fang, Bay (9/3/06), The Great Energy Game: As demand soars, central Asia’s oil and gas reserves are a magnet pulling in the world’s powers, p. 2, Accessed 27th October 2008, URL: http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/060903/11game_2.htm
27. Winstone, Ruth & Ross Young (16th March 2005), “The Caspian Basin, energy reserves and potential conflicts”, p. 13, Accessed 31st October 2008, URL: http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2005/rp05-024.pdf
28. Fang, Bay (9/3/06), The Great Energy Game: As demand soars, central Asia’s oil and gas reserves are a magnet pulling in the world’s powers, p. 1, Accessed 27th October 2008, URL: http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/060903/11game_2.htm
29. C.f. Ghoble, Vrushal (2009), “European Union and India: Contesting for Gulf Energy”, Regal Publications: New Delhi, p. 45.
30. Amineh, Mehdi Parvizi (March – April 2004), “Caspian Energy: A viable alternative to the Persian Gulf?”, EurAsia Bulletin, 8 (3 & 4), p. 6, Accessed 27th October 2008, URL: http://188.8.131.52/search?q=cache:OdiFwm2oH_oJ:www.eias.org/publications/bulletin/2004/marapr04/ebmarapr04p6.pdf+the+caspian+energy+resources+and+the+ asian+countries&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=7&gl=in
31. Pant, Girijesh and S.D.Muni, “India’s Search for Energy Security: Prospects for Cooperation with Extended Neighbourhood”, Rupa Publishers / Observer Research Foundation (ORF): New Delhi, p. 32.
32. Ibid: 32 & 33.
33. Energy Information Administration (EIA) (July 2006), Country Analysis Briefs: Bangladesh, Accessed 27th October 2008, URL: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Bangladesh/Full.html
34. “New Gas Reserve in Bangladesh Likely over 30 TCF: Survey” (9/2/2001), Accessed 27th October 2008, URL: http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/english/200102/09/eng20010209_61956.html
35. “Energy Profile of Bangladesh” (30th January 2007), The Encyclopedia of Earth, Accessed 29th October 2008, URL: http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Bangladesh
38. “Part Four: The Debate over Natural Gas Export from Bangladesh”, Accessed 27th October 2008, URL: http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/OPs/Samrina/contents/part4.html
39. Pant, Girijesh and S.D.Muni, “India’s Search for Energy Security: Prospects for Cooperation with Extended Neighbourhood”, Rupa Publishers / Observer Research Foundation (ORF): New Delhi, p. 57.
40. Bangladesh is divided into 23 blocks for oil and gas exploration and production. Government of Bangladesh (GOB) announced the First Round Bidding for eight oil and gas blocks in 1993 under which three important blocks 12, 13 and 14 were awarded to US oil company Occidental. When Occidental (Oxy) started drilling its first well at Magurchara under Moulavi bazar District, a massive blowout took place on 15th June 1997. The blowout caused severe damage to the environment, economy and social life of Bangladesh. The disaster also gave rise to human rights degradations in Magurchara.
41. “Part Four: The Debate over Natural Gas Export from Bangladesh”, Accessed 27th October 2008, URL: http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/OPs/Samrina/contents/part4.html
43. Pant, Girijesh and S.D.Muni, “India’s Search for Energy Security: Prospects for Cooperation with Extended Neighbourhood”, Rupa Publishers / Observer Research Foundation (ORF): New Delhi, p. 78.
44. Thu, Kyaw (20th– 26th August 2007), “Daewoo’s massive gas strike puts Rakhine region in spotlight”, The Myanmar Times,19 (380), Accessed 29th October 2008, URL: http://www.mmtimes.com/feature/energy/017.htm
45. Ibid: 146.
46. Ibid: 144.
47. Ibid: 148 – 49.
48. Kumar, Anand (19 / 01 / 2006), “Myanmar – PetroChina Agreement: A Setback to India’s Quest for Energy Security”, South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), paper no, 1681, Accessed 28th October 2008, URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers17%5Cpaper1681.html
49. Airy, Anupama (18th July 2007), “GAIL to pull out of Myanmar block”, The Financial Express, Accessed 29th October 2008, URL: http://www.financialexpress.com/news/GAIL-to-pull-out-of-Myanmar-block/205450/
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