A. Khaydarov

The south and south-east of the country, particularly the city of Kandahar and the districts of Kandahar province, continued to be the focus of military activity and accounted for approximately two thirds of total security incidents. The insurgents continued to conduct a campaign of intimidation, including through the targeted assassination of high-ranking Government officials, members of the security forces and influential local political and religious leaders affiliated to the Government. Spring and summer military operations conducted by International militaries allowed, to a certain degree, to change the security environment in some parts of the country. The Government of Afghanistan and the international community continued to implement the Kabul Process, the process of transition to Afghan leadership and responsibility, which was reaffirmed at the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Kabul on 20 July 2010 and subsequent meetings

* Dr. A. Khaydarov, Head of Office, Area Security Coordinator, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Kandahar. Paper presented in International Conference on Indian and Central Asian Perspective on Afghanistan, organised by India Central Asia Foundation, New Delhi, October 27-29, 2011.

of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (on security, governance and socio-economic development) in June and July 2011 respectively.

In the mid of July, the formal process of transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces started in some Central and Northern provinces of the country . In the South, only Lashkar Gah was included into the first phase of transition process. These areas continue to face a resilient insurgency that is attempting to challenge the capacity of Afghan forces to maintain security.

Peace and security on the territory of modern Afghanistan has currently become a key issue for the developing countries given the special urgency to maintain a stable socio-economic system and to protect the population from exrsting threats - both militant attacks and natural disasters, which is difficult to resist without collateral order in the region.

The recent Regional Peace Jirga of Ulemas of Southern Afghanistan held on 9 October 2011 in Kandahar reflected the growing local sentiments towards peace in the country. The Jirga was the most significant Ulema gathering in support of peace in Afghanistan since 2001 and complemented the Government’s peace and reintegration efforts within the APRP through the traditional non-governmental mechanism of Ulema Shuras in line of "track two diplomacy".

Meanwhile, both NATO troops and Afghan National Security Forces still face the resistance of insurgency, especially in the South, to their joint efforts to provide security for the Afghan civilians. That is why the decision of the U.S. President Barack Obama to withdraw the US combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 generated a lot of debate inside the country and abroad. In fact, it is expected that by the end of 2011, 10 thousand US troops will leave Afghanistan, whereas by the summer of 2012, 33 000 troops, constituting approximately one-third of the total U.S. military in this country are expected to withdraw. Security responsibilities in Afghanistan will be fully handed over to the national forces in 2014.

Meanwhile, the main objectives of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan as approved by Barack Obama in March 27,2009, remain unchanged:

To achieve the first strategic objective, the U.S. political leadership had to increase its contingent to 21 thousand troops, which allowed a sharp increase in the number of combat operations against Taliban forces in the South and the East. As part of this mission, measures have been taken to persecute and destruct the militants and to protect the citizens of major populated settlements accompanied with efforts to accelerate the training of Afghan security forces.

To achieve the second strategic objective, the U.S. administration has put the burden of dealing with the improvement of the security situation on the shoulders of the Afghan leadership. The United States also supports the Afghan Government’s efforts in the negotiations with those Taliban who lay down their arms and respect the rights of their fellow citizens within the Afghan Constitution. However, the possibility of transfer of security responsibilities to the regions is determined on an individual basis.

On the one hand, this indicates that the Afghan forces are not yet fully ready to ensure security in all regions of the country, on the other, the phase of "stabilization" is far to be completed. However, the transfer of responsibility to Afghans, i.e. transition, will not mean the immediate withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan, though NATO, according to their Secretary General, does not plan to stay in Afghanistan forever. Indeed, it appears that in the short and medium term, NATO has no choice but to remain in Afghanistan. At the moment, no other party is ready and likely to be willing to take a leading role in this country. No international or regional organization, under these circumstances, has more functional and military capability than NATO.

As for the Taliban, in July 2011 the movement issued a public statement requesting recognition as a political and military entity, in order to play a role in the peace and stability of Afghanistan and the region. In addition, the Taliban called on the regional States to create an environment of cooperation and trust based on common national interests. This development demonstrating the Taliban’s intention and efforts to play a more active role in Afghanistan and wider in the region on the one hand and the imminent US troops withdrawal from the country on the other hand raised many questions on the possible implications for Central and South Asia.

What are the possible consequences of the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan for Central and South Asia? Of course, it is difficult to expect that the withdrawal of international forces will stop the war in Afghanistan and significantly reduce instability in the region, which has arisen as a result of this war. Therefore, the international community should continue their assistance to Afghanistan in creating conditions for reaching an agreement among the Afghans.

Against this background, the planned stage-by-stage withdrawal of NATO troops might have ambiguous implications, first of all, for Afghanistan itself, as well as for Central Asian (CA) and South Asian (SA) countries. The withdrawal of troops might lead to the reinforcement of the ideas of radical Islam due to the expected enhanced political activities of the main opposition organizations acting against the current Government in Kabul. That is why the issues of building up efficient Armed Forces, the expansion of Central Government authority beyond Kabul and simultaneous implementation of the national reconciliation plan will continue to be of crucial priority for Afghanistan.

For CA countries, especially those who have common border with Afghanistan, the phased withdrawal of NATO troops will be an additional "incentive" for reinforcing their national borders with Afghanistan in order to secure themselves against possible enhancement of activities of terrorist groups, established within CA but currently operating on the territory of Afghanistan. Fighting drug trafficking will remain one of the priorities of the national security doctrines for these CA states.

The above factors will facilitate the search for effective mechanisms in addressing the main threats still emanating from Afghanistan. This situation will stimulate the formation of new elements of regional security with active participation of the United States, a leading player in the contemporary international relations in the Central Asia.

Speedy withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan at a time when the country is still plagued in the war might spread the flames of Afghanistan’s instability to remote areas and bring great destruction to the broader region consequently, covering Central and South Asia.

Firstly, the resolution of the conflict will allow CA to strengthen their security.

Secondly, all the neighboring countries have much closer economic relations with Afghanistan than the remote states. Expansion of relations will promote the economic development of Afghanistan and the surrounding countries.

Thirdly, instability in Afghanistan prevents the formation of a regional transport infrastructure, which, in turn, hinders the development of multilateral and bilateral economic relations in the region. Suffice it to mention, the importance of a transport access for Central Asia through Afghanistan to South Asia and the Indian Ocean. It is similarly true for transportation interests of the South Asian countries. Construction of roads in Afghanistan with the participation of neighboring countries has already begun but the demand for them is growing faster than they are being built now.

In this context, providing necessary security landscape in Afghanistan for further construction of communication infrastructure in and through Afghanistan may greatly contribute to overall security and political situation in Central and South Asia. Against this background, many transport projects like TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) could well be considered as a missing element in the effort to help India and Pakistan to come to a compromise on the issue of resolution of the Afghan conflict.

In fact, the TAPI project is a logical continuation of the policy of wide international cooperation of Central and South Asian countries, suggesting construction of new pipelines to various destinations. It is worth stating that, besides generating commercial and economic profits, this project could exert a stabilizing influence on the overall situation in the region and beyond. Apart from energy supply and economic gains, TAPI also presents a hope for larger, longer and mutually beneficial relationship between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. The pipeline is a thread which would bind these four countries.

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