Dialogue April-June 2008 , Volume 9 No. 4
Global War on Terror : the Pakistan Front
In South Asia, till September 11, three separate wars were going on against terrorism. India’s battle against Pakistan-aided terrorism in Kashmir and other parts of India, the American war against Osama and the rogue states that carefully excluded India’s concerns, and Pakistan’s ineffectual attempts to curb sectarian violence within, even as it promoted jihadi terrorism abroad. September 11 brought all three together and transformed them. Ideally it should have fused them into one massive struggle against those who kill innocents in the name of some cause, but in reality the struggle to unify them remains, even if the individual wars have become decidedly intense.
Viewed from South Asia, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States was , to use the overused cliche, a paradigm-shifting event. Afghanistan and Pakistan were caught in a whirlpool, threatening to take their neighbours down with them. It took Nine Eleven and its aftermath to pull them out. Only America had the power and, after the ghastly Nine-Eleven attack, the determination, to take the battle into the heart of darkness— Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Nothing, not even nuclear-armed Pakistan, the country that had created and backed the Taliban, dared to stand in its way.
Following the attack, President George W Bush declared a global war on terrorism. He and his administration clarified that this war would be fought across the world, and would be fought to the finish, no matter how long it took. Yet the vicissitudes of this war, not in the least the fateful American decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein, have been many. At a generic level, the United States needs a stable and prosperous Pakistan. Whether this entity is democratic or authoritarian remains a secondary issue to the US. Current American policies in the country are directly related to the issue of its global war against terrorism— but the issue of Kashmir, relations with India, non-proliferation and economic development also impinge on the relationship.
Under Musharraf, Pakistan became a formal ally of the United States war against terrorism. US leaders routinely praised Pakistani efforts, but the doubts and distrust that characterized the relationship has not quite been hidden. Pakistan is reported to have deployed 120,000 soldiers in the FATA and conducted operations that led to the killing and capture of hundreds of Al Qaeda personnel and losing over 700 personnel. But, any objective assessment of the situation will reveal that not only has Al Qaeda been reinvigourated as an organization, but that it has managed to help the emergence of a Pakistani Taliban which pose an even bigger threat to Pakistan and the restoration of normality in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s failure has been marked by the emergence of widespread terrorist networks of discarded jehadis like the Al Alami faction of the Harkat jehad-e-Islami and also the Al Qaeda, bent on revenge.
The US war centered on the use of Pakistan and its territory to eliminate the fountainhead of terrorism—the Al Qaeda and its Taliban backers. The terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, may have been physically planned by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri from Afghanistan, but Pakistan was the main logistical base of the plotters. The key conspirators like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed worked out of Pakistan and most of those involved in the operation traveled to Afghanistan through Pakistan for training. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan had been raised, trained and equipped by Pakistan as a means of taking control over Afghanistan so as to obtain a “strategic depth” vis-à-vis India.
To tackle the threat, the US made war on Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban regime. In the process it compelled Pakistan to abandon the Taliban and become part of their global war on terrorism. Ever since the launch of the war, which the US had declared would be total and uncompromising, it has made several key errors, and one blunder—the Iraq war. Prominent among these errors has been its decision to prosecute this war in a less than total fashion and to rely on a single individual, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan. Depite claimed successes, in July 2007, the US National Intelligence Estimate on “The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland” noted that the task had not been completed. Indeed, the al Qaeda had actually “protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants and its top leadership.” All this had happened despite the fact that the US had supplied some $10.5 billion worth of security and economic aid to Pakistan as well as some $ 1 billion per annum as reimbursement that accounts for 96 per cent of the costs incurred by Islamabad in the FATA. To top this, in April 2008, the US Government Accountability Office issued a report “Combating terrorism” which noted that the US still lacks a comprehensive plan to destroy the terrorist threat, especially its safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA. The GAO pointed out that a comprehensive plan had been mooted by the US National Strategy to Combat Terrorism in 2003 , it had been called for by the Nine Eleven Commission and the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 passed thereafter by the Congress. Yet, neither the National Security Council, nor the National Counterterrorism Center nor other branches of government “ have a plan that includes all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic and law enforcement support.” The criticism is not that the state department, the Pentagon, the CIA or USAID don’t have plans, but there is no comprehensive strategy in place.1
The result has been a growing frustration among US policymakers and politicians over the relations with Pakistan. On one hand, there are calls for the US to prosecute the war against the Afghan insurgents and the Al Qaeda into Pakistan if needs be unilaterally, on the other there are demands that a much tougher accounting be carried out for the US assistance to Pakistan. By May 2008, it was clear that the relationship is at a breakdown point with Pakistan and the US is no longer on the same plane with regard to the war on terrorism. The latest ceasefire between the Pakistani forces and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leader Baitullah Mehsud is no longer conditioned on the latter stopping attacks on Afghanistan, or ending the presence of foreigners—Uzbeks, Chechens or Arabs in their midst. This actually indicates an unraveling of US policy in Pakistan whose primary aim was to end the sanctuary that the Al Qaeda got in the region. According to the NYT, Owari Ghani, the governor of North-West Frontier Province, who is also Musharraf’s representative for FATA told US officials that “Pakistan will take care of its own problems, you take care of Afghanistan on your side.”2
Less than total
Since 9/11, the world has sought to present a united front against terrorism. The UN has passed three resolutions. In the wake of 9/11, UN Security Council resolution 1373, which acting on the draconian Chapter VII enjoined on states to criminalize fund collection for terrorist acts, freeze such funds and sequester property of people involved. It also demanded that states refrain from support “active or passive” to those involved in terrorism, “deny safe haven” to those who planned or carried out such acts, and demanded that states cooperate in fighting terrorism. , declared “ ...acts, methods and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations “. It called upon Member States to “become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols” and “to increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocol”. It also established a 15-member Counter-terrorism committee (CTC).
In 2004, it adopted a resolution 1535, that led to the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to provide the CTC with expert advice on all areas covered by resolution 1373. CTED was established also with the aim of facilitating technical assistance to countries, as well as promoting closer cooperation and coordination both within the UN system of organizations and among regional and intergovernmental bodies.
During the September 2005 World Summit at the United Nations, the Security Council – meeting at the level of Heads of States or Government for just the third time in its history adopted resolution 1624 that called on states to prohibit “by law incitement to commit a terrorist act …prevent such conduct…[and] deny safe haven to any persons” who may be involved in terrorism. Yet the problem with this impressive body of international law is that we still lack a single definition of terrorism. The United Nations has been struggling to come up with one, but has not yet put it down in black and white. This is the escape clause that had helped countries like Pakistan to make their war against terrorism a highly selective act. During a visit to Tajikistan in June 2002, Musharraf declared in a speech that without eliminating the root causes, international terrorism could not be eradicated. Among the root causes he included outstanding political issues such as Kashmir, Palestine, immense poverty of less-developed countries, illiteracy and gap between rich and poor countries.
That the war would be less than total became apparent first in the context of India. After the attack on the Parliament in India on December 13, 2001, the US message to India was to restrain itself and seek a solution through a dialogue. But the events of 9-11 and its fallout had a sharp impact on Indian public opinion which felt that the government ought to follow the American example. So when four terrorists attacked the India’s Parliament House on December 13, 2001, there were calls for immediate retaliation. India mobilized its army for war and demanded that Pakistan end cross-border terrorism, dismantle the infrastructure it had created to back this activity and deport twenty top terrorists on its wanted list. Pakistan angrily declined, but the pressure from India and the world community compelled Pakistani Musharraf to make his January 12, 2002 speech where he declared: “No organization will be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir....Strict action will be taken against any Pakistani individual, group or organization found involved in terrorism within or outside the country.”
Neither of the promises have been lived up to. Musharraf’s responses to the Indian action were tactical, designed to prevent Indian retaliation and deflect international pressure. On one hand he threatened India with nuclear retaliation and on the other he made declaratory commitments to end cross-border terrorism. This was evident in the aftermath of the next major incident. On May 14, 2002, terrorists attacked the residential quarters of an Army camp at Kaluchak, near Jammu, and killed over 35 persons, many of them women and children. This attack came at a time when the Indian Army was still massed at the border and expectations were that India would react. For two weeks the situation teetered on a balance, but the US stepped into the picture and after some hard persuasion, India stayed its hand in exchange for Musharraf’s commitment, conveyed through the United States, that it would end infiltration ‘permanently.’ This commitment, too, was not kept. Cross-border infiltration climbed to its ‘normal’ levels in Jammu and Kashmir and violence intensified, targeting a state assembly election that was held in September-October 2002. However, following the elections, the Indian authorities decided to pull back their forces from the border. This was despite yet another major terrorist incident, an attack on Akshardham temple in Gujarat state on the night of September 24 killing 28 persons, including women and children.
Had the US taken tough action against Musharraf at this stage, perhaps it would not have had to face a similar situation later. From the outset it was clear that Musharraf and the US had differing agendas. Musharraf decided to support the US war against terror to preserve as he himself put it, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its Kashmir policy, in other words, fears as to what would happen if an angry United States decided to punish Pakistan as well. Pakistan first tried to persuade the US to spare the Taliban and its leadership. Then, it tried to bargain with the US to protect the Taliban’s traditional strongholds near the Pakistan border in South-eastern Afghanistan. When the Taliban and Al Qaeda were routed, Pakistan sought to salvage what it could by ensuring that Pakistani personnel seconded to the Taliban were spirited out of Afghanistan along with the top echelon of the Taliban leadership.3
Subsequently, it ensured that in its campaigns against the Al Qaeda, the Taliban were left alone. Historically, the ISI did not have relations with the Al Qaeda and it decided to round up any such elements that fell into its hands and hand them over to the US so as to show that they were indeed committed to fighting terrorism. At the same time, however, the Taliban were quietly sheltered in Pakistan and allowed to regroup. The self-serving and calculated campaign of Pakistan is evident from the manner in which Musharraf used the opportunity of the war on terror to launch a campaign against a number of sectarian Sunni groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Sipah-e-Sahaba, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideed al- Alami, Harkat-ul-Jehad-Islami and their Shia counterparts, the Sipah -e Muhammad. The key was that these groups were involved in sectarian violence within Pakistan, and not involved in the jehad against India. Groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen were however allowed to function. After the attack on the Indian Parliament, these groups were restricted, but allowed to function from Azad Kashmir. This is a position that obtains to this day. Till 2005 the US did not quite object to the Pakistani policy of capturing the Al Qaeda and ignoring the Taliban. The resurgence of the outfit and complaints from President Hamid Karzai finally led to the US putting pressure on Islamabad on the issue of the Taliban. But when the Pakistan army, mainly the Frontier Corps began operating in South Waziristan, it provoked a counter reaction. Though it succeeded in capturing hundreds of Al Qaeda fighters, it merely pushed the radical groups to North Waziristan and Bajaur. By 2006, the Pakistan army worked out a deal with the tribal insurgents and entered into a ceasefire . The US grumbled, but did little about it. But in 2007, following the Lal Masjid incident, the so-called Pakistani Taliban expanded dramatically and began to overflow from FATA into other areas of the NWFP and Swat. The last-named area was wracked by a rebellion by Maulana Fazlullah and his Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad.
US in Afghanistan
Till the US struck at Osama bin Laden’s Zhawar Khili base in 1998, there was a near-hopelessness in the battle against the Taliban. Pakistan undertook a state policy of turning them towards Kashmir and Afghanistan, while countries like India, Iran, and Russia braced for the worst as triumphant Taliban forces readied for their offensive against Ahmad Shah Masood. Central Asian republics of Tajikstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan waited for the inevitable and all plans by energy majors to exploit the riches of this region were put on hold as the Taliban’s millennial leader Mullah Omar came under the baleful influence of Osama bin Laden. The overthrow of the Taliban led to a favourable environment in Afghanistan which culminated with the presidential election that saw Hamid Karzai elected to the post of president of the country. Unfortunately, the event almost coincided with the revival of the Taliban and its rapid resurgence across the country in 2005-6 as an even more effective political and fighting force than it had been in the past. The Taliban are no longer merely involved in hit and run operations. They have launched a sophisticated political campaign that aims to defeat the US and NATO forces and systematically undermine and overthrow the Karzai government.
It is obvious that the US perspective on Pakistan is shaped by the Afghan situation. Almost every aspect of the situation in that country is linked to developments in Pakistan. Pakistan cannot be held to all the blame for the failures of US and NATO in Afghanistan, even though it played a key role in enabling the organization to regenerate at a time when the outfit was under severe attack. The inability of the Karzai government to establish its hold over the country also lies in the corrupt and faction-ridden history of his supporters. His government has not been able to deliver basic services like education, economic development and justice. As for NATO, their contribution to the war has been tentative. Even the big western European countries have provided minuscule forces. Others have kept their contingents out of combat duties. Because of various national mandates, the 38,000 force functions in less than optimal fashion. As it is the US contingent is just about a division strong. The Afghan National Army, though around 80,000 in size has yet to make itself felt as a fighting force.
The Indian experience with counter-insurgency has shown that the key element in any war is “boots on the ground” or the number of troops you can put into a region to dominate it. Given the size of the country, notwithstanding American air power, there are simply not enough forces to provide the kind of security environment that would be of any value to an average Afghan. To compound it, is the fact that the bulk of the fighting is still being done by foreign forces. These are forces that are bound to go home some day, and in this case, NATO’s reluctance is manifest even now, and this feeds into the insecurity of the Afghan countryside and pushes the average Afghan to make his accommodation with the Taliban.
US and Musharraf
Perhaps the biggest fault of the US in Pakistan has been that from the outset it has relentlessly placed all its bets on Pervez Musharraf. He has been given an enormous leeway by the US leadership in Washington. Musharraf was given the benefit of doubt vis-à-vis India. In June 2003, he was invited to Camp David by President Bush and a 5 year multibillion dollar package was worked out for Pakistan. Just how much became apparent in 2007 when Pakistan was wracked by an unprecedented political crisis following the dismissal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhury. Going into summer, Musharraf found himself caught in a pincer. On one hand, he found himself in direct confrontation with the fundamentalist elements on the Lal Masjid issue. On the other, the lawyers movement demanding the reinstatement of Chief Justice Chaudhury resulted in the growth of a pro-democracy sentiment in the country. The US State Department initially declared that the issue was an internal matter of Pakistan. Later the US official spokesman said that the dismissal was “a matter of deep concern” . At the another briefing the spokesperson even declared that in the view of the US, Musharraf was acting in the “best interest of Pakistan and the Pakistani people.”
The movement reached a crescendo when on May 12 Karachi was rocked by riots that killed scores of people. It was widely believed that the violence was triggered by the pro-Musharraf Mohajir Qaumi Movement which was determined to prevent Chief Justice Chaudhry from addressing a meeting in the city. Chief Justice Chaudhry was subsequently reinstated in July. But on November 3, 2007, Musharraf declared a state of emergency and dismissed the Chief Justice, seven Supreme Court judges and scores of high court judges. The supreme court was then reconstituted. The US simply ignored the development and Deputy Secretary John Negroponte acknowledged at a congressional hearing that the US government had “been silent on the subject.”
As of now it is not clear as to whether Pakistan has such a plan either. Though Pakistan has fought the tribal uprising . But one thing is clear, Pakistan still views the situation through strategic and geopolitical lenses. They view terrorist groups operating against India as useful instrument of prosecuting their subconventional war against India. These are the same calculations that make up Islamabad’s calculations with regard to the Taliban. India’s role in Afghanistan, the possibility of a US/NATO pullout from Afghanistan are issues that Islamabad is carefully weighing. This dual policy was, after all, shaped by Musharraf as commander-in-chief and President of the country. Perhaps the most negative aspect of the US dependence on Musharraf has been the extent to which the US has lost the battle of hearts and minds in Pakistan itself. The US now confronts a paradoxical situation where civil society in Pakistan is keen to prosecute the battle against radicals at home, but do not see the US as an ally of any kind in the process. Indeed, they are profoundly suspicious of US motives and actions. The victory of the Awami National Party in the North-west Frontier Province and the restoration of civilian rule in Islamabad poses several issues for the future. As of now, the Pakistan army under Pervez Ashfaq Kayani has declared its intentions to steer clear from politics. Musharraf has lost a great deal of prestige and faces the real prospect of having his powers trimmed drastically.
Having backed the wrong horse, the Americans are not happy. Shortly after winning the elections, the coalitition government headed by Yousaf Raza Gillani announced its decision to talk to the militants in FATA. An unofficial ceasefire has been put in place, but the talking is being done by the Army which has agreed to formalize the arrangement with Baitullah Mehsud, who it had been earlier accused of assassinating Benazir Bhutto. In February, Pakistan’s ambassador to Kabul, Tariq Azizuddin, was abducted by militants who want the release of the three persons arrested for Benazir’s assassination and Mullah Obaidullah, former defence minister of the Taliban.
On April 25, Mehshud distributed pamphlets declaring an end to all hostilities. The deal says that militancy will be at an end, all foreigners will be expelled in exchange for prisoners held by the Pakistani authorities and the Pakistan army will be gradually withdrawn from South Waziristan. The deal appears similar to the one that took place in 2006, which US authorities said led to a tripling of infiltration into Afghanistan. Clearly, the deal seems to suggest that the influence of those who back the Taliban in the Pakistani establishment is still there. However, in the past five years, the very nature of the FATA leadership has changed. The old tribal leaders who functioned in an autonomous fashion have been replaced by the younger leadership that openly acknowledges its links to the Taliban by calling itself the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. They have proved themselves to be adept fighters and tacticians. Since 2004, they have used the tactic of ceasefires to consolidate their own hold and expand the area of their operations.4
There are great expectations from a civilian government in Pakistan. But we need to take that with a pinch of salt. Historically, such governments have allowed the army to run the key security and India related issues. Indeed, both Nawaz Sharif’s government in the early 1990s and Benazir’s thereafter have had questionable ties with Islamists. Musharraf’s troubles with the civilians should not be automatically seen as the Pakistan Army’s headache. For the moment the latter are lying low and allowing the former to absorb all the punches. But they are very much there as a corporate entity.
In this perspective, there are a number of immediate measures that the US can take up in Pakistan: The US must rejig its policy of “praising in public and pressuring in private”. This has provided the space for Musharraf to carry out his two-faced policy.
1. The US must demand that the
Pakistanis target the Taliban leadership that is based in Pakistan.
2. The US must insist that the cooperation with the ISI must involve access to assets and networks relating to the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The ISI has successfully kept the US out of the process.
3. The US must take a harder look at the Pakistani demand for aid and change the method of reimbursing 100 per cent to one which is based on actual scrutiny and expenses.
In the ultimate analysis, a great deal will depend on the kind of nation Pakistanis want – a modern secular nation or an irredentist Islamic one. For fifty years Pakistan has projected itself as a state built not on any distinct ethnic, historical or geographical basis, but on being ‘non-India’. Its very conception was flawed: It was created, and is still seen by its proponents as a homeland for Muslims of the subcontinent who do not want to be submerged by ‘Hindu India.’ But India has never been ‘Hindu’, despite the rise of Hindutva in recent years. Pakistan has been setting itself in contradiction to an entity that does not exist, except in the figment of its imagination. In recent years, this took an antagonistic form and encouraged by the military-political complex, Pakistani fundamentalists, the same ones who backed the Taliban, have declared a jihad on India. Pakistan has also sought to straddle two worlds—that of Islam and liberal democracy.
But the latter has given ground to the former beginning with the decision in the early 1950s to see its sovereignty being vested in the hands of Allah, to Nawaz Sharif’s effort to make the Shariat as a part of the constitution in 1999. In fact it is Musharraf who has tried to mark out the middle-path with his concept of “Enlightened Moderation”. This was, not surprisingly articulated in an oped in The Washington Post and was tailored for western audiences.5 Musharraf sought to reform Islamic legislation like the Hudud ordinance and declared his intention of reforming the madarsa system. But, political expediency required that he stay close to the mullahs of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, the alliance of Islamist parties which backed the general in his critical hour of need in 2003-4.
The confrontation brewing between the US and Pakistan could bring to the fore all the contradictions of US policy. The US may find that its policy of going along with the army-led Pakistani elite is not working and that they will have to go in for a policy that demands the full reconstruction of the Pakistani military-political complex and replacing it with a liberal democratic framework. A good beginning can be made by overhauling, if not disassembling the ISI. One way could be to push for the ISI to become a civilian agency, like its counterparts in the other countries, and to ensure that its mandate makes it steer clear of involvement in domestic politics. Transforming Pakistan from a praetorian Islamic entity to a liberal democratic state is a challenge that cannot be done by a chastened Musharraf or secularist elements in Pakistan alone. It has to be a global enterprise that involves constant pressure on the military-political complex to keep on the straight and narrow and give way to a liberal democratic setup.
India has a major role in aiding a Pakistani make over – by working to resolve the Kashmir dispute. This is not to give credence to unreconstructed Pakistan’s claims, but to acknowledge that over the years, fed by military-political complex, the issue has taken on a life of its own and exercises a large number of ordinary Pakistanis. Even while India moves to come to a practical agreement with the Kashmiris, the international community must aid the Pakistani military-political complex to make a soft-landing on the hard ground of reality.
A detailed reading of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act passed in 2004, which broadly endorsed the recommendations of the Nine Eleven Commission report, shows that this is indeed the long-term aim of US policy. It required the US to provide a minimum of $600 million military and economic aid per year to Pakistan and mandated that the US president report to Congress on the long-term strategy to engage with and support Pakistan. The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act includes a requirement that the President report on America’s long-term strategy for engaging Pakistan and makes it clear that future waivers of coup related sanctions “should be informed by the pace of democratic reforms, extension of the rule of law, and the conduct of parliamentary elections.” Section 1442 of the act also includes a provision that would end military aid and arms sales licenses to the country in 2008 unless the President certified that the Pakistan government was making “all possible efforts” to end Taliban activities on Pakistani territory. Yet as the GAO report cited above notes, the US is still far from approaching the problem in a holistic fashion. Given the enormous stakes of the US, it is unlikely that US anger will lead to a cessation of arms sales and economic aid. The essence of the Pakistan recommendations in both the legislations we have cited above is that the US intends to keep Islamabad in its close embrace. As long as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri are in Pakistan/Afghanistan, the United States cannot walk away from the region. US disengagement in the 1990s enabled the Al Qaeda to establish itself in Afghanistan. So unlike Iraq, there will be little pressure for the US to pull out from the region because it could quickly revert to becoming a training area for more strikes against America and the West.
The future of US-Pakistan relations remains on a hazardous plane. Given the circumstances, if there were another major terrorist attack on the United States from elements based in Pakistan/Afghanistan, there could be a meltdown of US-Pakistan relations that would overturn many of these assumptions or recommendations.
US Government Accountability Office, “The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan
to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas,” (Washington DC, April 2008).
2. Jane Perlez, “Pakistan defies US in halting Afghanistan raids,” New York Times May 16, 2008.
3. Ashley J Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror: conflicted goals, compromised performance,” (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008) p. 3.
4. Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehreeek-e-Taliban of Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008, vol 1 issue
5. Pervez Musharraf “ A Plea for Enlightened Moderation” The Washington Post June 1, 2004.
|Dialogue (A quarterly journal of Astha Bharati)|