Dialogue April-June, 2005, Volume 6 No. 4
Naxalite Movement in Bihar and Jharkhand
Introduction
In a development that could have far reaching implication not only for Bihar and Jharkhand but also for other States, the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI)1 and the Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (People's War) merged in the united formation, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) CPI-Maoist, in September 2004. Both the groups have been the most powerful ones, accounting for about 88 percent of the countrywide Naxalite violence and 90 percent of the resultant deaths.2 The merger has resulted in further escalation in the level of Naxalite violence in these two States. For example, Bihar, where Maoists are active in approximately 30 out of 38 districts, was the worst affected States in 2004, with 155 Naxalite-related killing between January and November 30, 2004. Jharkhand, where Maoists are active in 18 out of 22 districts, ranked second, with 150 deaths as against 117 in 2003.3 The unification of Naxalite groups, largely interpreted as the beginning of a new phase in Naxalite movement in India, has also been influenced by the perceived success of Maoism in Nepal and activities of several front organizations in the last few years.4
An attempt has been made in this paper to map the trajectory of Naxalite movement in Bihar and Jharkhand in the light of current developments, historical experience and complex interplay of factors that have shaped the course of the movement. The paper argues that the course of the Naxalite movement in these two States would depend, to a great extent, on how it manages contradictions emerging out of complex interplay of the ideological commitment and various factors that have influenced the behaivour of these groups at the grassroots level.
Ideological Synergy and Escalation
Spread of Violence
Contrary to popular belief that the creation of the separate State of Jharkhand in November 2000 would result in a decline in violence, there has been an upsurge in Naxalite activities in these two States. With the bifurcation of Bihar, a number of affected districts in South Bihar went over to Jharkhand, and it was expected that the Naxalite groups will suffer a setback in the remaining areas. The succeeding years, however, have not only witnessed a consolidation of extremists in their strongholds, but a further expansion into newer areas. Thus, apart from traditional strongholds in Patna, Gaya, Aurangabad, Arwal Bhabhua, Rohtas and Jehanabad in South western parts of the State, there has been a spurt in extremism in parts of North Bihar, bordering Nepal, including the West Champaran, East Champaran, Sheohar, Sitamarhi, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga and Madhubani districts. The Naxalites have also extended their areas of influence in Shaharsha, Begusarai and Vaisali, and areas along borders with Uttar Pradesh.
Similarly, in Jharkhand, the feeling before November 2000 was that the region was backward and neglected because the political and bureaucratic establishment, dominated by officials from the ‘non-tribal’ areas of Bihar, did not care for the tribals. It was widely believed that a new government that was more representative of tribal interests would be in a better position to address to their legitimate grievances. The successive governments have, however, failed to contain the expansion of Naxalism. Indeed, it seems that the creation of Jharkhand has helped the Naxalites consolidate their roots in the region. At present, the worst affected districts are: Chatra, Palamu, Garhwa, Giridih, Latehar, Gumla, Ranchi, Hazaribagh, Lohardaga and Bokaro. Jharkhand, with a dense forest cover over large parts of the State, offers favorable terrain for the Naxalites to operate and build their bases. The Naxalites have also consolidated their presence in areas bordering Orissa and West Bengal and have been responsible, to a substantial measure, for escalation of Naxalite violence in the neighbouring States. Taking advantage of poor coordination among law enforcement agencies between two States, the Naxalites commit crime in one State and slip into the borders of neighbouring States.
Annual Fatalities in Naxalite violence in Bihar and Jharkhand
State 2001 2002 2003 2004
Jharkhand 200 157 117 150
Bihar 111 117 127 155
Source: Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, at http://www.mha.nic.in/AR0304-Eng.pdf
Unified Onslaught
Apart from a host of internal factors such as failure of the State governments to address issues contributing to the growth of Naxalism, poor performance of civil administration in rural and tribal areas, ill-equipped police force, and the existence of a collusive arrangement between a section of politicians, bureaucrats, contractors and extremist elements, this escalation of violence is largely due to increasing coordination between the CPI-ML (PW) and MCCI in the last few years. These groups were at wars in the 1980s and for most part of the 1990s, which took the lives of hundreds of their cadres in various parts of Bihar and Jharkhand. Their leaders differed on personal and ideological issues and turf war to hold territory often overshadowed the unity efforts. However, both these groups made concerted effort to forge unity, which was evident in increasing degree of coordination in these two States.
Though the move for unity among Maoist groups is not a new thing, it got a momentum after the PWG entered Bihar after a merger with the CPI-ML (PU) in 1998. The process to bury differences to fight the ‘common enemy’ reportedly started in 1999. Though separate decisions were made by the MCCI and the PWG in January and March 2000 to end conflict, but the results were not encouraging due to opposition from some of the top leaders of the MCCI and clashes between cadres of the two groups at the grassroots level. The efforts to forge unity became serious when some hardliners in the MCCI leadership, who had staunchly opposed any type of association with the PWG, left the organization in 2001. During a two-day meeting held at a secret place on August 23-24, 2001, the PWG decided to end their conflict.5 In a joint statement, both the groups expressed their willingness “to end the conflict at any cost” after indulging into an “open criticism and self criticism”. Stating that separate decisions were made by the MCCI and the PWG in January and March 2000 to end the conflict, the two outfits held the grass-roots level activists responsible for the killing of over a dozen MCCI and PWG cadres.6 Moreover, intense police operation in Jharkhand, and large scale use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) forced both the groups to enter into strategic alliance and refrain from encroaching on one another’s territory.7 In November 2002, a joint statement issued by the two groups at Patna stated that the indiscriminate use of the POTA against the activists and sympathizers of Naxalite groups by the Jharkhand government had ‘compelled them to iron out differences’ and fight jointly against the State machinery.
Linkage with Nepalese Maoists
Growing linkage of the Naxalites in Bihar with Maoist insurgents in Nepal has also been responsible, in many ways, for unification of Maoist parties and resultant expansion of their activities in Bihar. The linkage between these two groups has been largely seen as a pre-requisite for further unification, consolidation and expansion of Maoism in different parts of the country and across South Asia through creation of the 'Compact Revolutionary Zone' stretching across Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Bihar, to Nepal. Expansion of Naxal activity in Bihar is an important part of this strategy and the prevailing situation in Bihar helps these outfits. The porous Bihar-Nepal border, the general breakdown of rule of law, poor governance and incapacity of the police force provides a context for these left extremist groups to operate with ease. Bihar has eight districts with 54 police stations situated along the 753 kilometer long open border with Nepal, which has become increasingly vulnerable to use by the Nepalese Maoists. A number of Maoist insurgents have been arrested from different parts of Bihar in the last few years.
The MCCI and CPI-ML (PW) have been maintaining close relations with the Nepalese Maoists for some time. In February 1996, the MCC Central Committee published a paper welcoming the Maoist movement in Nepal. In October 1996, the MCC condemned the repression of the Maoist movement in its Congress. Reports in April 2000 informed that the MCC and Maoists were holding joint training camps in Hazaribagh and Aurangabad. In July 2001, the MCC along with the PWG and the Maoists in Nepal, formed an umbrella organization, the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) to unify and coordinate the activities of the Maoist Parties and organisations in South Asia. All three groups are part of the joint 'Indo-Nepal Border Regional Committee,' and unconfirmed reports indicate that the Indian Naxalite groups have been training Nepali Maoist cadres in various training camps in Bihar and Jharkhand. Apart from the CCOMPOSA, the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), which came into existence in 1984, has also been trying to coordinate the activities of Maoist parties in South Asia. Leaders of the RIM are believed to have acted as mediators to strengthen the extreme left in the region.
Growth of Naxalism
Emergence of Organisations
Does the current phase of Naxalism in these two States represent a new phase? To what extent, will the ideological synergy at the top will percolate down at the grassroots level where the growth of the movement has been conditioned by a number of other factors such as caste dynamics, political linkage, growing criminalization, lack of ideological commitment and turf war over financial resources? The impact of the current phase of violence on the future of Naxalite movement will depend, to a great extent, on their ability to manage these contradictions.
Even a cursory glance at the trajectory of Naxalite movement in Bihar and Jharkhand would reveal that though it developed in the backdrop of rich tradition of peasant and tribal movements—both during British and post-independence period8, it grew through its complex interaction with a number of local issues, which have defined the course of the movement. The basic demand of Naxalite movement during the early phase revolved around the issue of land relations, self-respect, respect for their women and payment of minimum wages. The organizations which espoused these demands, could not evolve a common understanding on various strategic, tactical and organizational issues. Thus, we find the emergence of a number of Naxalite groups in the undivided Bihar.
The movement, which originated in the small town of Naxalbari in Darjeeling district, West Bengal had a direct impact on the undivided Bihar. Leading the movement in the State was the nine-member Bihar State Committee of Communist Revolutionaries, which began spreading its activities in various parts of the undivided Bihar. The Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) came into existence in 1969. In early 1970s, some CPI-ML leaders began to establish contacts in Jehanabad and Palamu areas, but many of them were arrested during the emergency period in 1975. When these leaders were released during the Janata government in 1977, some of them organized themselves into CPI-ML (Unity Organisation) in 1978. The same year, the Mazdur Kisan Sangram Samity (MKSS) was formed.
During the 1980s, three groups had major impact on Naxalite movement in Bihar: the CPI-ML (Liberation), the CPI-ML (Party Unity) and the MCCI. As early as 1982, the Bihar government in its Notes on Extremist activities-affected areas reported that as many as 47 out of a total of 857 blocks, spread over 14 districts were affected by the left wing extremist movement.9 The CPI-ML (Liberation), which had a formidable presence in the central parts of undivided Bihar, decided to function as an over ground political party in 1992. It was stated that “the party does not rule out the possibility under a set of exceptional national and international circumstances, the balance of social and economic forces may even permit peaceful transfer of central power to revolutionary forces”. It was, however, added that the party must prepare itself for winning the ultimate decisive victory through an armed struggle”,10 though it admitted that the situation was not ripe for such a movement. Reports suggest that it still maintains underground squad in some regions. The party also has a string of organizations to mobilize students, women and workers. They are: All India Students Association, Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha, All India Coordination Committee of Trade Unions, All India Progressive Women's Association and Jan Sanskritik Manch.
Another prominent Naxal group, which emerged during the 1980s, was the CPI-ML (Party Unity). It tried to organize the peasantry as the main force of democratic revolution. They adopted the twin strategy of selective annihilation and economic blockade of landowners.11 In a major effort at the consolidation of left-wing activity, the CPI-ML (Party Unity) merged with the People's War Group (PWG) of Andhra Pradesh in 1998, to constitute the CPI-ML (People's War).
However, one Naxalite groups which had maximum impact on the course of Naxalite movement in Bihar, and in many sense represents the true character of the movement is the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). The group, earlier known as the Dakshin Desh, was active, during the initial days in West Bengal and Gaya and Hazaribagh districts of undivided Bihar. In the perception of the MCCI, the struggle is fundamentally a movement for appropriating political power. Thus, the political education of the peasants reaches its completion when the peasants uphold the fact that fights for land is only a means to launch a war to capture of power.12
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the MCCI concentrated its strength in Bihar; and with the perspective of building up people’s army and base area, the Bihar-Bengal Area Committee was set up. The emergency period suppressed their activities, but in 1978-79, they once again began to mobilize the peasants. Till 1982, the MCC was mostly underground. Gradually, the group began to operate through these mass fronts. In Bihar and Jharkhand, it maintained a string of front organizations, including the Naujawan Pratirodh Sangharsh Manch, Krantikari Budhijivi Sangh, Krantikari Sanskritik Sangh, Krantikari Chhatra League, Communist Yuva League, Naari Mukti Sangh and Mazdoor Mukti Sangh.13
The MCC disagreed with the CPI-ML’s approach of class annihilation. It accepted action against the ‘class enemies’. It advocated mass action in which conscious people enraged by class hatred would spontaneously participate in the annihilation of class enemies. But it was vehemently opposed to secret and indiscriminate killings by the squad.14 It carried out a number of massacres in the central parts of undivided Bihar. On October 7, 1986, the MCC killed 11 persons belonging to the upper caste Rajput community in Darmia village Aurangabad district in Bihar. On May 29, 1987, the MCC massacred 42 persons belonging to an upper caste Rajput family at Dalelchak-Baghaura village in Aurangabad district, Bihar. On February 12, 1992, the MCC massacred 37 members of the landowing upper caste Bhumihar community at Bara village, Gaya district in Bihar. On March 18, 1999, the MCC massacred over 34 upper caste Bhumihars in Senari village, Jehanabad in Bihar. On November 18, 1999, the MCC killed 12 persons in Latu village, Palamu in Jharkhand. On April 14, 2001, the MCC killed 14 persons at Belpu village, Hazaribagh district in Jharkhand.15
One of the features of the Naxalite movement during that phase was bitter internecine clashes among these groups. The clashes between the MCCI and the CPI-ML (Party Unity) resulted in the death of hundreds of cadres of both the organizations in central and southern parts of undivided Bihar. After the rapprochement between the MCCI and the CPI-ML (PW), the main rivalry remains between the latter and the CPI-ML (Liberation), which after eschewing the path of armed revolution is increasingly finding it difficult to maintain its turf in its strongholds particularly Bhojpur and Patna districts of Bihar. The PW’s growing influence in these districts has caused serious problems for the Liberation group.16 According to sociologist and former Naxalite, Mr Sashibhushan, the Liberation, after giving up the annihilation line, “has no solid means to cash in on the anger of the people against exploitation.17 Apart from ideological factors, these organizations were locked in bitter war of supremacy in a particular area.18
Caste Dynamics and Sena Phenomenon
Apart from internal dissension and internecine clashes, the caste dynamics also influenced the movement since the 1980s. The polarization along the caste line deepened, when the dalits were mobilized by the left wing extremists and increasingly stereotyped as Naxalites by the upper castes who banded together. The result was a closing of ranks, not only among the richer and landowners, but also along caste lines that embraced every rung of the social ladder, down to the poorest of the castemen. It affected the organizational structure, mobilization strategy and activities of Naxalite groups at the grassroots level. If we examine the pattern of violence in Central parts of undivided Bihar, the entire confrontation was moulded by caste factor and not by class ideology. The Naxalite leaders also recognized the importance of caste in mobilization. As Dipankar Bhattacharya of the CPI-ML (Liberation) says that we can not afford to completely ignore the role of caste. Sometimes class struggles do overlap with caste war while on some other occasions class struggle relegated to background and caste violence does take place.19
This complex pattern of Naxalite mobilization and counter mobilization on the basis of caste gave rise to what is generally called the Sena (private army of landowners) phenomenon in Bihar. Though armed gangs have been part of feudal history of rural India, Bihar is the only State in post-independence India where private armies of landowners exist. Most of these private armies emerged in late 1970s, and 1980s as a feudal response to the growth of Naxalite groups. Since then, an estimated 15 private armies have existed at various points of time in the State, including prominently: the Kuer Sena, the Bhumi Sena, Lorik Sena, Sunlight Sena, Bramharshi Sena, Kisan Sangh, Gram Suraksha Parishad and the Ranvir Sena.
Most of these Senas, with a limited cadre strength and area of operation, could not sustain their existence for long and eventually withered away. However, among all these, the Ranvir Sena emerged as the most dreaded and ruthless group. Over the years, the Ranvir Sena extended its influence to the Jehanabad, Patna, Rohtas, Aurangabad, Gaya, Bhabhua and Buxur districts, mobilizing the landed caste groups in these districts against the various left-wing extremist organisations. Over the years, the Ranvir Sena carried out a number of massacres in Central Bihar. On June 16, 2000, its cadres killed 34 persons at Miapur village, Aurangabad district. On April 21, 1999, 12 persons were killed at Sendani village, Gaya district. On February 20, 1999, 11 persons were killed at Narayanpur village, Jehanabad district. On January 25, 1999, 23 persons were massacred in Sankarbigha village, Jehanabad district. On December 1, 1997, 58 persons were massacred at Lakshmanpur-Bathe village, Jehanabad district. On April 10, 1997, 10 persons were killed at Ekbari village, Jehanabad. And on March 23, 1997, Ranvir Sena cadres killed 10 persons at Habispur village, Patna district. Though the Ranvir Sena claimed to have targeted only Naxalites, its victim, by and large, have been landless and poor peasants of the most backward castes.20
The context of the Sena’s activities has been conditioned by an extreme polarization of State politics and the bureaucracy on the basis of caste. It had linkage with many top level politicians on the sole basis of caste loyalties.21 Since the landowner groups constituted a powerful political lobby entrenched in the government, the police and the bureaucracy, the pattern of state intervention and even the government approach to the conflict were conditioned selectively by these linkages.22
However, in the last few years, the Sena has been sufficiently weakened particularly after the arrest of its chief, Brahmeshwar Singh at Patna on August 29, 2002. Reports also indicate that the Ranvir Sena has been at the receiving end for some time now, and has lost much of its earlier influence among upper caste land owners. One of the reasons is the increasing criminalization of the outfit.
Linkage with Mainstream Politics
Linkage with political parties has also conditioned the behaviour of Naxalite groups and this is reflected in their behaviour during elections and their relationship with mainstream political parties. Though these groups have been insisting on election boycott to wean people away from parliamentary politics, there has been a palpable change in their attitude towards elections. The behaviour of Naxalite groups during elections have suggested that their stated objectives have little role to play as far as grassroots mobilization of electoral support is concerned. In Bihar, during the recent State Assembly elections in February 2005, though the CPI-Maoists officially declared that the continuance in power of the ruling RJD is against the interest of the party, it, at the same time, admitted that the Naxalites and the RJD ‘share the same social base’. It has also reportedly alleged that Laloo Prasad Yadav has been trying to bribe its cadre and activists through Government contracts and projects.23 Alleging a nexus between the MCC and RJD, the CPI-ML (Liberation) says, “MCC used to extend its support to the RJD in Bihar and JMM in Jharkhand during earlier elections. In the last elections some of their commanders were seen openly canvassing for the RJD candidates in Bihar”.24 According to Saibal Gupta, secretary of the Asian Development Research Institute: "I won't say they are hand in hand. Because the social base of the RJD and MCC is the same, there is a natural coalition.'' 25
Muscle power plays a critical role in elections in these states and the enormous clout wielded by Naxalite groups at the grassroots level has been one of the crucial instruments of influence in the electoral process. In Jharkhand, according to one estimate, the Naxalites are capable of influencing the election process in some 54 of the 81 Assembly constituencies.26 Unsurprisingly, Naxalite groups often use their influence to support candidates or political formations which provide them a favourable context for operation in the post election phase. Therefore, it is not surprising that their violence or threat of poll boycott never result in active boycott or a decline in vote percentage. Thus, for instance, during the April 2004 Parliamentary Election in Jharkhand, where the pre-poll campaign was marred by a series of attacks on security force personnel, the voter turnout was recorded at 55.71 per cent. Even in some of the worst-affected districts, including Palamu, Hazaribagh, Singhbhum and Lohardaga, the voter turnout ranged between 49 and 60 per cent. Similarly, many Naxalite dominated areas in Bihar registered an impressive voter turn out.
There are reports, moreover, that these groups have themselves contested the elections through proxies. For example, during the Panchayat (Village Council) elections in 2001, activists of both the PWG and MCCI contested in Jehanabad district. In the Parliamentary Elections of April 2004, a former 'sub-zonal commander' of the MCCI, Ramlal Oraon alias Veer Bhagat, contested as an independent candidate from one of the worst Naxalite-affected constituencies, Chatra in Jharkhand, and the voter turnout in some of the worst-affected Assembly segments recorded their highest turnout in the last 20 years.27 Clearly, despite the announcement of the unification, the factors that have historically influenced the behaviour of Naxalite groups still remain operative, and will continue to have a considerable influence during the election process.
Financial Incentives and growing criminalisation
Their muscle power, enormous presence at the grassroots and a collusive arrangement with a section of politicians, government officials and contractors offer huge financial incentive to these groups. And this is facilitated by inability of the state to enforce its writ in Naxal-affected areas. These groups are able to hold jan adalats (kangaroo courts) and administer instant justice, leaving the administration gaping.28 The extremists impose levy on government projects.29 The collection ranges from forest contractors, businessmen, civil contractors, villagers and government officials including police in some areas. The Naxalites have also threatened the Golden Quadrilateral project in their areas of influence. As a result, progress in these areas is probably the slowest of the GQ stretches. In fact, the Naxal fear is not restricted to this area or to the PM highway alone. They have also threatened companies such as Steel Authority of India Limited-run iron ore mines at Megahahatburu.30 Although, the Naxalites claim that they are fighting an ideological war, they are basically involved in making money. Smuggling of woods, taking cut from government officials from development fund and extortion have become main business of Naxalites.31
The dwindling role of ideology and financial incentive has led to growing criminalization of the outfit. In many cases, the local ‘commanders’ due to lack of proper ideological indoctrination and lure of money behave like ordinary criminals. Stories of deviations and degeneration of Naxalite groups appear regularly in media. Degeneration in Naxalite movement resulted in emergence of protection racket.32 Moreover, a number of persons with criminal backgrounds have joined the movement to secure some safety from the law. In addition, there are a number of examples of land having been captured by Naxalite outfits.
State Response
One of the important factors that have sustained this self-sustaining dynamics of Naxalite violence in Bihar and Jharkhand is the lack of proper state response and failure of the administrative machinery at the grassroots level. As a result, in many areas government officials do not even attend their offices due to the threat posed by Naxalites.33 In these areas, development works are executed more often than not on paper.34 In August 1999, special House Committee of the Bihar Legislative Council which was asked to study the chain of violence and counter violence in Central Bihar, said the lack of political will and determination on the part of State in tackling extremism head on, its failure to set up agencies unafraid to step into the disturbed regions and political affiliations of the extremist groups with mainline parties are some of the reasons for the aggravating extremist violence in Bihar.35
No proper attempt has been made to equip police force properly to deal with the threat. Even in Jharkhand, where the successive governments relied heavily on police operations to neutralize the armed groups, proper attention was not paid to this aspect. The police operations suffer due to lack of adequate and appropriate equipment - including basics such as automatic weapons, landmine detectors, transport and communications; a proper intelligence network at the grassroots level; and better protection to police officers and personnel in the Naxalite affected areas. Therefore, it is not surprising that despite large-scale arrests under the POTA, the government was not able to contain the violence. In Bihar also, lack of resources is a major handicap. The extremist groups on the other hand, are well trained and possess even sophisticated arms.36 On April 16, 2003, the then Director General of Police, DP Ojha, made an official statement before the Press that the State police were not equipped well enough to prevent extremist violence in Bihar. He said. “How can one expect the police force to contain the extremists? They don’t have even matching fire power, lack standardised police pickets and are deprived of state-of-art communication system besides bullet-proof vehicles and mines-protected vehicles?”37
The surrender policy announced by the government has not had desired results. Apart from poor implementation of the scheme, the fear of retribution by Naxals is the reason for poor records in surrender. Maoists have been ruthless in dealing with the deserters and any activist who felt tempted by the surrender package must be ready to face the consequences.38
Another important reason for the growth of Naxalite movement has been the government’s inability to implement land reforms. The village economy supports nearly three-fourths of the State’s population, yet it remains one of the most exploitative in the world.39 The landowners were politically very influential and were largely responsible for poor implementation of the policy.
Conclusion
There is little evidence, under the present circumstances, that the present and projected initiatives by the governments will succeed in neutralising the growing menace of extremism in these two States. Moreover, the factors that sustained the movement and pattern of politics remains the same in these States and if the forces that shaped the course of the Naxalite movement remain in the control of socio-political and administrative structures of these States, and Naxalites do not make any positive intervention to alter them, the recent trends in ideological synergy and resultant upsurge in violence can not be interpreted as any fundamental change in the character of Naxalite groups.
Note: The views expressed by the author are his personal.
References
1 The outfit was earlier known as the MCC before merger with the Punjab-based Naxalite group, the Revolutionary Communist Center of India (Maoist), RCCI (M)
2 Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, at http://www.mha.nic.in/AR0304-Eng.pdf
3 Statement in Parliament by the Union Minister of State for Home on December 14, 2004. See, “Maoist violence claims 518 lives: Jaiswal”, http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID= IEP20041214093514 &Page=P&Title=States&Topic=0&. Also see, Annual Report 2003-04, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, at http://www.mha.nic.in/AR0304-Eng.pdf
4 Prominent among such organizations which have been active are: the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM), the World People’s Resistance Movement, South Asia (WPRM South Asia), the Krantikari Jansangarsh Ekjutta Samiti and outfits involved in the Mumbai Resistance 2004.
5 “MCC, PW to be ‘friends’”, The Times of India, Patna, August 31, 2001, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id =306670839
6 Ibid.
7 In Jharkhand, one of the highest number of cases were registered under the POTA. See, Sanjay K Jha, “Jharkhand: Anti-Naxal Strategy and Use of POTA”, at http://www.ipcs.org/nmt_militaryIndex2.jsp?action =showView&kValue=976&military=1016&status=article&mod=b
8 Some of the peasant and tribal movements that took place in the region such as the Kol and Bhumuj movement (1831-33), the Santhal Resistance Movement (1885), the Munda Uprising (1889), the Champaran Satyagraha (1917), and the Kisan Sabha movement had far reaching impact on the consciousness of the peasantry.
9 Prakash Singh, The Naxalite Movement in India, New Delhi: Rupa, 1995, p.121
10 Prakash Singh, p.128
11 Prakash Louis, People Power: The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar, New Delhi: Wordsmith, 2002, p. 182
12 Lal Chingari, January 1993, p. 48
13 Maoist Communist Centre, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/MCC.htm
14 Samanta, 1984, p. 207
15 The list of massacres have been taken from, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/MCC.htm
16 Nalin Verma, “PW makes inroads into Liberation turf”,
http://www.bihartimes.com/articles/nalin/pw.html
17 Ibid
18 Shivanand Shukla, “More intra-left violence feared in Bihar”,
http://news.indiainfo.com/2000/10/04/4left.html
19 Interview with Dipankar Bhattacharjee, at http://www.bihartimes.com/dipankar.html
20 Satyendra Kumar, “Victims of extremist violence rue their lot”,
http://www.timesofindia.com/210700/21mpat7.htm
21 Mammen Mathew, “Caste, Politics& the Cycle of Strife”, Faultlines, vol. 2, p. 143
22 Ibid
23 Varghese K George, “Maoists open to truce with CPI-ML but not poll pact”, at http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=62424
24 The “Poll Boycott” by MCC and PWG”, at
http://www.cpiml.org/liberation/year_2004/june/commentary2.htm
25 Harinder Baweja and Sanjay Kumar Jha, “ Inside the Bloodland”, at
http://www.india-today.com/itoday/05041999/bihar.html
26 “Pradesh ke 54 vidhan sabha kshetron mein matdan ki disha modne ki kshamta rakhte hain ugravadi”, , at http://ind.jagran.com/newssite/citynews.asp?cityid=132&Ipageno=7&stateid=8
27 Dainik Jagran, Ranchi, January 6, 2005
28 Dipak Mishra, “Extremist violence in Bihar on the rise”,
http://www.timesofindia.com/290500/29indi26.htm
29 Ibid
30 Manoj Prasad, “In Jharkhand, GQ runs into Maoists, extortion”, at
http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=37017
31 Nityanand Shukla, “PWG's tentacles spread far and wide”, at http://www.dailypioneer.com/secon3.asp?cat=\state9&d=STATES
32 Mammen Mathew, op. cit
33 “Naxal fear now blocks development in Jharkhand”, http://www.newindpress.com/Newsitems.asp?ID=IEP20011226111356& Title=States&rLink=0\
34 Ibid
35 Mammen Mathwe, “Extremist Violence: Panel blames it on lack of political will”,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/040899/detSTA04.htm
36 J P Yadav, “Parallel powers in Bihar outshine the ill-equipped Rabri Devi”, The Asian Age, September 28, 1997
37 “DGP raises hands over Naxal issue”, at
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